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Explanatory note for diploma work named as “Methodological bases for 
maintaining the operational reliability of the fuel system of a long-haul passenger aircraft 
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Object of study – is optimal method of maintaining the operational reliability of the 
fuel system of a long-range aircraft with two turbojet engines and its components. 
Subject of study – fuel system of Boeing-777 and it’s maintenance methods. 
The purpose of the work – to increase the operational reliability and improve some 
maintenance procedures of the fuel system of chosen aircraft with the implementation of 
modern technology. 
Research method – analytical processing of all regulatory, technical documents, 
maintenance manuals, Maintenance programme of the operator and statistical data on fuel 
system failure or malfunction with reported conclusions from national transportation safety 
board. 
The Practical meaning of diploma work results is determined by evaluating the 
reliability of Boeing-777 fuel system increase, enhancement of some maintenance procedure 
and technical operation efficiency rise. 
Scientific novelty – the main idea is to propose using of digital twin sensors 
additionally to aircraft communication addressing and reporting system (ACARS) where it 
will enhance operational reliability and decrease the maintenance cost of the airplane. 
Materials of diploma work are recommended to use during study process and practical 
activity of design bureau specialists. 
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LIST OF ACCEPTED ABBREVIATIONS, 
SYMBOLS, UNITS, AND TERMS 
 
AC – aircraft; 
DTS – digital twin sensor(-s); 
DTT – digital twin technology; 
ICAO – International Civil Aviation Organization; 
MP – Maintenance programme;  
SAA – State Aviation Administration; 
APU – auxiliary power unit; 
ACARS – aircraft communication addressing and reporting system; 
MEL – minimum equipment list; 
NTSB – National Transportation Safety Board; 
NA – not accessible; 
AE – adverse event(-s); 
ECS – engine control system; 
O/J – override/jettison pumps; 
FOHE – fuel/oil heat exchanger; 
FMU – fuel metering unit; 
EICAS – engine indication and crew alerting system; 
FMC – flight management computer; 
FDR – flight data recorder; 
CDU – control display unit; 
CVR – cockpit voice recorder; 
QAR – quick access recorder; 
FQIS – fuel quantity indication system; 
ACMF – aircraft condition monitoring function; 
EHM – engine health monitoring; 





EASA – European Union Aviation Safety Agency; 
FAA – Federal Aviation Administration; 
AMM – aircraft maintenance manual; 
ELMS – electrical load management system; 
AI – artificial intelligence; 
FBG – fiber bragg grating;  
OSA – optical spectrum analyser; 
AWG – arrayed waveguide grating; 
WDM – wavelength division multiplexing; 
EDG – Echelle diffractive grating; 
PIC – photonic integrated circuit; 
AE – acoustic emission; 
 
𝑅(𝑡) – reliability; 
𝑡 – continuous operating hours/cycles between diagnostics; 
𝜑(𝑡) – constant failure rate; 
𝑒 – exponential function; 
𝑄(𝑡) – probability of failure; 
 𝑆𝑖 – possible state of aircraft; 
 𝜂 –  degree of adverse factors; 
Kd – laboriousness coefficient; 
 t  – failure rate; 
y
H  – differential pressure on the seal; 
   –  coefficient of slot seal flow; 
Q – fluid leakage; 
Tm – coefficient of variation; 
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The serviceable systems of each wide-range aircraft are an indivisible part of airplane 
normal operating conditions. The reliability and durability of main elements or separate 
units is the general task of the maintenance department of any airline or one or another 
operator. Normally, each modern company or operator has own Maintenance programme 
(MP), methods, instructions, technologies and procedures which are distinctly approved 
according to manufacturer's regulatory documents and consequently due to International 
Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) or State Aviation Administration (SAA) requirements. 
To meet the needs of passengers and cargo transportation without increasing fleet of 
aircraft required to use modern scientific and technological progress in the field of aviation, 
to find out new approaches how to maintain the necessary level of profitability and 
adaptation all present operations  according to rigid rules of aviation industry . This means 
you need as widely as possible to implement various improvements leading to increased 
performance, efficiency and safety. 
My diploma work is dedicated to studying the fuel system of a long-haul passenger 
aircraft (AC) with two turbojet engines (on the example of Boeing-777) and investigates 
new methodological bases to increase the operational reliability of it. 
Fuel systems of modern AC are a complex set of interrelated subsystems. A variety 
of functional and structural connections require appropriate maintenance and defined 
manufacturer's safety margin during any AC operation. This is achieved by rapid growth of 
the aviation industry (before the COVID-19 quarantine), technologies, appropriate 
competition between aircraft manufactures all around the world, including Boeing company 
and Airbus, eternal wishes of designers to reveal new trends and new solutions in aircraft 
manufacturing. 
The main task of any fuel system in any airplane, starting from general aviation and 





aviation fuel continuously and safely without any malfunction or even failure. Furthermore, 
the fuel system is designed for placement on aircraft fuel and uninterrupted fuel supply to 
the aircraft engines, auxiliary power unit (APU). Also on some AC, fuel is used to cool the 
oil, air conditioning systems, electronic equipment and AC weight balancing, etc.  
As well as a working fluid in a variety of automatic devices (control jet nozzle and 
leaf blades input guiding device). To obtain such level of operational reliability is very 
complicated task, so manufacturer, operator, and technical personnel have to strictly follow 
all regulations, maintenance procedures, documents and AC manuals during any types of 
maintenance works including fuel system. So, it is really important to maintain all elements 
and aggregates in airworthiness condition. Moreover, the operator has to have relevant and 
efficient maintenance department. Finally, the problem of new methodological bases for 
maintaining the operational reliability of the fuel system is very important. 
The development of scientific and technological progress in civil aviation sets targets 
to further improvement of safety and reliability of AC. As was mentioned before the 
development of scientific and technological progress in civil aviation sets targets for further 
improvement of safety and reliability of AC. Hence, this development needs involving of 
new solutions which can propose something new, more practicable or flexible due to tasks 
of the present day. 
All in all, if the operator will be possible to monitor all data, condition and any failures 
of fuel system and its components continuously via satellites with implementation of digital 
twin technology (DTT) it will definitely increase operational reliability. 
In this diploma I would like to propose the implementation of DTT with digital twin 
sensors (DTS) on the example of Boeing-777 based on the results of the analysis of 
reliability of the units of the fuel system, statistical data about their failure, maintenance 
manuals, technical documentation, procedures, and malfunctions. 
Realization of DTT will definitely increase the operational reliability, safety margin 
and to find out new methodological bases during maintenance works. All in all, it helps to 






CHAPTER 1: ANALYSIS OF THE RELIABILITY OF THE FUEL SYSTEM OF 
BOEING-777 AND ITS COMPONENTS 
1.1 General estimation of operational reliability of the fuel system  
The main purpose of carrying out an assessment of the operational reliability of the 
fuel system is to determine the conformity of their level of reliability with the requirements 
of airworthiness standards.  
  Due to the definition of reliability is: “The ability of an apparatus, machine, or 
system to consistently perform its intended or required function or mission, on demand and 
without degradation or failure.” To contain the threats and improve the index of operational 
reliability, actions may be undertaken from the early design phase of the system, to its use 
phase. The safety assessment of any aircraft and its components is mandatory at the design 
phase for certification purpose and recommended processes and methods have been given 
for its achievement. Simply stated, the certification period is aimed to verify the 
airworthiness condition of AC in complex and fulfilment of safety and operational 
requirements. Due to the particular complexity of the fuel system it is necessary to consider 
the components interaction, maintenance procedures and analyze the failure propagation 
referring on some real accidents reports during the Boeing 777 operation which are directly 
connected with fuel system malfunction. In addition to this is very important to study how 
exactly the maintenance of the fuel system is provided according to all regulatory technical 
documents and highlight all advantages and disadvantages for minimizing any faults or 
failures. 
To cover fuel system operational reliability issues, one has to identify the relevant 
types of information involved in the aircraft operability. I would like to consider design 
phase information together with the necessary data during the service. During the aircraft 
design phase, model-based safety analysis are conducted for the verification of the 
compliance with safety requirements and the establishment of Master minimum equipment 
list (MEL). However, for an operational reliability evaluation all the functional conditions 
that may be required during the different phases of the missions must be taken into account 





 So, let us consider some main requirements for the fuel system of Boeing-777: 
− fuel system of long-range passenger aircraft has to perform constant fuel supply 
with the consumption not less than 100% necessary for aircraft engines during any 
operational settings; 
− the fuel has to be delivered to engines under constant pressure and temperature, 
which are specified in engine certificate; 
− each main fuel pump has to provide a normal operating mode during different 
stages of flight whilst emergency pumps have to be operative and suitable during 
any malfunction or emergency situation; 
− pipelines have to be rigid and properly fixed to avoid any vibration and sustain 
structural loads from fuel pressure in expected conditions of flight; 
− fuel has to freely streamed through the fuel flow meters or cross-feed valves; 
− fuel filters have to be available for sump drain and possess quick release units; 
− to meet the highest level of fuel flow capacity (including engine operating 
restrictions); 
− to be reliable and properly checked 
 As we can see in this short list of the main requirements are obligatory  for every 
Boeing-777 in service. 
The next step of our reliability assessment will be the real data, reasons and National 
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) agency reports of all Boeing-777 accidents which 
anyhow connected with the fuel system. Nowadays, has produced 1646 units of Boeing-777 
in different configurations and producing is still going. Beginning of commercial operation 
was in 1995, first flight was conducted in 1994. It was first brainchild of the Boeing 
company with the implementation of new for that time fly-by-wire system. 
As of October 2016 only 18 accidents were occurred. Four of them were directly 
connected with fuel system malfunction. For better understanding of the operational 
reliability it is also necessary to identify the main aggregates or units of the fuel system that 
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Briefly having analyzed all this data, we can see that less than in 25% cases fuel 
system of Boeing-777 in different modification was the reason of the incident. It tells us that 
structure and manufacturing have big safety margin, but anyway some cases were 
experienced and our task is to decrease or even avoid these malfunctions in the future. Now 
let's try to obtain some calculations with using this data. 
Input data :  
− Boeing-777 aircraft; 
− NTSB reports, statistical data; 
− Reliability 𝑅(𝑡): probability system still working since start of mission; 
− 𝑡 – continuous operating hours/cycles between diagnostics; 
− 𝜑(𝑡) – constant failure rate (failures/hr); 





The complete mathematical formula of operational reliability of any element or 
complex system assessment will be looking like: 
                                                    𝑅(𝑡) = 𝑒−𝜑𝑡                                                   (1.1) 
     𝑅(𝑡) = 𝑒−0.00007∙1251 = 0.87 
 In this equation, we can see that our reliability value is 0.87 ( a calculation was made 
on the example of flight from Beijing to London ). Normally, when airline starts to operate 
new AC the reliability value of system or any element is about 1. We can observe this real 
tendency shown in failure rate graphics (figure 1.1). Nonetheless, it tells us that Boeing-777 
is very reliable and well-designed AC. 
 
Figure 1.1 – Failure rate graphics of any element and system 
However, to finalize the assessment of operational reliability of fuel system and its 
units of our AC it is necessary to take into account outer conditions which definitely have 
direct influence to our AC. These conditions we can determine like: 
− the probable occurrence of complications of flight conditions (R1) Q110
-3: 2,93; 
4,5; 7,9; 4,1; 
− the occurrence of a difficult flight situation (R2) Q110
-4: 3,2; 4,84; 7,87; 4,05; 
− occurrence of an emergency flight situation (R3) Q110
-6: 3,1; 4,87; 8,1; 3,7. 
So, it may be possible to make a first small conclusion that an indicator of operational 
reliability is the probability of occurrence of a special situation in flight, with the appearance 





calculated probabilities of functional failures that cause the emergence of special flight 
situations with normalized, allows to evaluate the perfection of the structure and, if 
necessary, to make a constructive enhancement of the elements or improvements in 
maintenance procedure. 
The fuel system of Boeing-777 consists of tanks, pipelines, aggregates, heat 
exchangers, fuel meters, cross-feed valves, pumps, fuel nozzles any other devices and 
provides fuel filling, its placement, feed to the engines, as well as a measurement of the 
amount and fuel consumption. The basic scheme of the fuel system of the Boeing-777 with 
its structural components is shown in Figure 1.2. 
 
Figure 1.2 – Basic scheme of the fuel system of the Boeing-777 
All in all, initial assessment of operational reliability of the fuel system of our AC 
tells us that Boeing-777 fairly reliable airplane. Nonetheless, in 20% of all 18 cases failures 





necessary to emphasize that despite of modern ACARS already present in the Boeing-777, 
implementation of DTT and development of new approaches for maintenance procedures 
are still actual. As a result of the analysis, preliminary conclusions can be drawn about the 
possibility of changing the periodicity of maintenance of units and even systems, and in 
some cases, to determine the main directions of operational and theoretical studies for 
increasing the reliability of products. 
1.2 Quantitative assessment of the relationship between the disruption of the 
system's operability and an emergency situation during any phase of flight for the 
Boeing-777 
As was mentioned before any AC is very complex mechanism which has to be reliable 
as much as it possible and provides the maximum level of operation efficiency, operability 
with a moderate involving of material resources. It is well known, that on modern AC, many 
auxiliary and basic systems ensure appropriate functioning of various consumers what is 
vitally important. Moreover, this functioning has to be very constant despite of many factors 
which have own negative influence during airplane operation.  
Due to ICAO statements and issued materials abnormal situations in flight arise when 
an aircraft in normal flight mode is exposed to one or more adverse factors. Therefore, such 
situations have a pronounced random nature. To assess the degree of danger of 
contingencies, it is convenient to use the Airworthiness Standards governing the list of 
situations and probability of their occurrence in flight. The degree of danger can be 
determined from the assumption that during the life of the aircraft each of the four 
contingencies will give the same level of risk. By combining all contingency situations with 
their normalized indicators and using this assumption, we can quantitatively determine their 
degree of danger (risk level) in the form of probabilistic indicators.  
In flight, the aircraft is affected by a large number of adverse factors. The evolution 
of an adverse event (AE) in flight is associated with a combination of several factors that 
exponentially complicate the situation. So, almost all events in air transport result from 





− Aviation accidents with human casualties (disaster (D)); 
− Accidents without casualties (accident (A)); 
− Serious aviation incidents (there was a real safety risk); 
− Aviation incidents (there was a potential safety hazard). 
The factors that eventually lead to an accident are related to crew activities human 
factor, functional efficiency of the aircraft technical factor and environmental conditions 
environmental factors. Thus, an AE for the most part is a complex event serving as the last 
element in a chain of sequential events with cause-effect relationships. 
 Tracing the sequence of adverse event development, we can distinguish from the very 
beginning the following categories of causes, namely: main, immediate and concomitant. 
The main one creates a potential opportunity for the emergence of AE in a certain situation. 
Moreover, immediate and concomitant causes create real conditions for turning such an 
undesirable opportunity into reality. Thus, the immediate cause is the one that entails AE 
with a big probability. As was mentioned before, abnormal situations in flight arise when 
an aircraft in normal flight mode is exposed to one or more unfavourable factors (risk 
factors) what have unexpected negative influence to the flight . In the Airworthiness 
Standards, such situations are classified as special situations. Special flight situations are 
characterized by a combination of aircraft properties or performances and psycho-
physiological indicators of crew members when such indicators differ from the normative 
ones and the flight mode definitely differs from the “regular” one. Simply stated, based on 
this defined concept during flight, five possible states or conditions of the aircraft can be 
distinguished. We denote them by 𝑆𝑖, where i  = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4: Normal (“regular”) Flight in 
the absence of risk factors – 𝑆0; Complication of Flight Conditions – 𝑆1; Dangerous 
Situation – 𝑆2; Emergency – 𝑆3; Catastrophic situation – 𝑆4. 
− 𝑆0 is a “regular” situation when the flight is taking place under the expected 
operating conditions in the range of recommended flight modes; 
−  𝑆1 is a Complication of Flight Conditions – a “State of the aircraft in flight” 





or a slight deterioration in the characteristics of stability and controllability or 
flight characteristics of the aircraft; 
−  𝑆2 is a Dangerous Situation – a “State of the aircraft in flight” characterized 
by a marked increase in the psycho-physiological load on the crew or a 
noticeable deterioration in flight characteristics, stability and controllability, as 
well as one or more flight parameters exceeding operational limits, but without 
reaching limiting restrictions and design conditions. A difficult or catastrophic 
situation in an emergency can be prevented by the timely and correct actions 
of crew members, including immediate changes to the flight plan, profile and 
flight mode; 
− 𝑆3 is an Emergency – a “State of the aircraft in flight” characterized by a 
significant increase in the psycho-physiological load on the crew, deterioration 
of flight performance, stability and controllability, and leading to the 
exceedance of limiting restrictions and design conditions. Prevention of an 
emergency leading to a catastrophic situation requires high professional skills 
of crew members; 
− 𝑆4 is a Catastrophic Situation – a “State of the aircraft in flight” which implies 
that deaths are almost unavoidable when it occurs. 
As can be seen from the formulations, all normalized indicators of special situations 
are qualitative in nature and can be summarized in Table 1.2.  
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Unparalleled Prevention of human casualties is practically impossible 
The Airworthiness Standards also describe the possible frequency of these situations. 
Depending on the nature of the event under consideration, the following probability values 
relative to one hour of flight or one flight cycle are used as a quantitative (numerical) 
representation of the probabilities of occurrence of these situations as recurring situations: 
− Repetitive > 10−3; 
− Moderately likely – from 10−3 to 10−5; 
− Unlikely – from 10−5 to 10−7;  
− Very small possibility – from 10−7 to 10−9;  
− Practically impossible – ≤ 10−9; 
The given indicators are widely used in the certification of aviation equipment, 
investigation of aircraft accidents, as well as in various interpretations in scientific works. 
When a special situation is taking place, i.e. when there is no corresponding aircraft’s 
reaction to the pilots’ actions in their attempts to counteract the effects of the risk factor, one 
of the above-indicated adverse events occurs: an incident or an accident (figure.1.3). 
 
Figure 1.3 – Scheme of causes of the emergency and catastrophic situations 
During the flight, the aircraft is exposed to various types of failures, malfunctions and 





by the crew or adverse environmental influences. Critical failures are dangerous and can 
lead to an aviation accident or incident. For the flight crew, the elimination of the effects of 
such an adverse factors exposure is associated with the performance of complex activities 
under conditions of high emotional stress and time pressure. These include the failure of 
ECS (engine control systems), fuel system assemblies and other important aircraft units and 
systems, wind shear, thunderstorms; gross mistakes by the crew, etc. The degree of danger 
of such 
failures can be described by the expression 0 << 𝜂 <1 (figure 1.4). Such failure can lead to 
flight mode interference, worsen aircraft stability and manoeuvrability, increase crew 
emotional stress, etc., but it does not compromise flight safety. The crew successfully deals 
with the effects of such an failure exposure. In this case, it can be assumed that 0 < 𝜂 <<1. 
Harmless adverse factors do not lead to dangerous consequences, they only cause minor 
difficulties in flight. Such a degree of hazard for adverse factor can be taken as 𝜂 = 0. 
Figure 1.4 – Expression of the degree of adverse factors 
The given ranges of hazard variation are rather uncertain and require clarification both 
in terms of the content of the concept and in terms of the value of the quantity. To resolve 
this contradiction, we will assume the below statements. Let’s say, logically evaluating the 






− Catastrophic events, whether aggravated by the action of AE or by a 
combination thereof, may be attributed to events that are virtually impossible, 
with a frequency of less than 10−9; 
− Emergencies caused by the same reasons can be attributed to near-unlikely 
events with a frequency of 10−7÷10−9; 
− Dangerous situations caused by the same reasons can be attributed to unlikely 
events – their frequency is 10−7÷10−5; 
− Complication of flight conditions due to moderately probable and frequent 
events – the frequency is 10−5÷10−3. 
Using the above-formulated frequency of occurrence of different hazardous 
situations, we will determine the probabilities of non-prevention of different special 
situations from the assumption that a certain aircraft during its service gives the same degree 
of risk for each of the four special situations. Assuming that a certain in-service aircraft fleet 
gives the same degree of risk for each of the four special situations, the unobserved value of 
the probability of adverse factors effect elimination can be determined based on the 
following example: since the probability of a catastrophic situation occurring within one 
flight hour (one flight) is defined as the day-night level of 10−9, while in special situations 
the probability of occurrence of complex flight conditions is 10−3, which results in the 
probability of elimination the value, that is, the probability that the situation will not turn 
into a catastrophic one, must be greater than or equal to 10−6And if the effect of the adverse 
factor leads immediately to an emergency situation, the frequency of which is set to 10−7, 
the normalized value, that is, the probability that the situation does not go catastrophic, must 
be greater than or equal to 10−2, and so on. Then, for each of the four possible situations, 
the degree of hazard and the nature of the hazard can be written down as follows: 
− Catastrophic situation: 𝜂 = 1; 
− Emergency situation: 10−2 < 𝜂 <1; 
− Dangerous situation: 10−4 < 𝜂 < 10−2; 





From the above it follows that the comparison of the gradation of special situations 
by consequence severity (non-elimination of consequences) with the gradation of special 
situation occurrence frequency is one of the guiding principles for assessing both the aircraft 
and flight safety. The full relationship between specific situations, their consequences, 
incidence and degree of danger are based on the above judgments. 
In this regard, we need a constructive improvement of the fuel system, with the 
implementation of modern solutions aimed at improving the operational reliability. Simply 
stated, to reduce the possibility of AC getting into a dangerous situation through the failure 
or malfunction of the fuel system or its unit and aggregates. 
1.3 Evaluating the reliability of the Boeing-777 fuel system components which 
have been already failed during all history of commercial operation 
In this part of my diploma project I would like to analyze the reliability of fuel system 
components which were involved during accidents for all history, of all Boeing-777 
commercial operations on routes and demonstrate vital conclusions from the NTSB and 
SAA official reports. Let's say, that this assessment will help a lot to highlight the most 
problematic spots and definitely helps us efficiently implement DTT on this aircraft. 











figure 1.5). The centre tank contains two override / jettison (O/J) pumps and each main fuel 
tank contains two boost pumps, identified as forward and aft. Each of the pump inlets is 
protected by a ¼ inch mesh screen and the pumps are equipped with a check valve fitted in 
the discharge port, to prevent fuel in the fuel feed manifold flowing back through the pump. 
A pressure switch, mounted between the pump’s impeller and check valve, monitors the fuel 
pressure and triggers an advisory warning in the flight deck if the pressure rise across the 
pump drops below a value, of between 4 and 7 psi. 
Figure 1.5 – Simplified diagram of the airframe fuel system 
The fuel feed manifold runs across the aircraft and connects to the engine fuel feed 
lines. The manifold is split between the left and right system by two cross‑feed valves, 
identified as forward and aft. When these valves are closed, and the centre tank is the source 
of the fuel, the left O/J feeds the left engine and the right O/J feeds the right engine. The 
fuel from the left and right main tanks supply their respective engines during main tank feed. 
Spar valves in the fuel manifold provide a means of shutting off the fuel supply to the 
engines.  
To prevent large amounts of ‘free water’ building up in the fuel tanks, the aircraft is 
fitted with a water scavenge system that uses jet pumps operated by motive flow from the 
OJ and boost pumps. The aircraft is equipped with a centre tank fuel scavenge system, which 
increases the amount of useable fuel in this tank. The system uses jet pumps, provided with 
motive flow from the boost pumps, to draw fuel from the lowest part of the centre tank and 
feed it into both main fuel tanks. A float valve mounted in the centre tank turns on the motive 
flow when the centre tank contents are below 15,800 kg.  
Float valves mounted in each of the main fuel tanks prevent fuel scavenge when the 
contents of these tanks are above 12,500 kg. Each tank is vented to atmosphere through 
channels in the roof of the fuel tanks, which are connected to surge tanks mounted outboard 
of each of the main tanks. The surge tanks are vented to atmosphere through a flame arrestor 
and a scoop mounted on the lower surface of each wing. If fuel is loaded into the centre 





As the O/Js operate at a higher delivery pressure than the boost pumps the centre tank 
will empty first. The airframe fuel system supplies fuel to the low pressure engine-driven 
pump, which forms part of the main engine pump. This raises the fuel pressure (and fuel 
temperature slightly) and pumps the fuel through a Fuel/Oil Heat Exchanger (FOHE) – 
figure 1.6. The FOHE serves the dual purpose of cooling the engine oil and raising the 
temperature of the fuel so that ice does not affect the downstream components, including 
the low pressure pump filter and the Fuel Metering Unit (FMU). The FOHE is a hybrid 
cross-flow / counter-flow design and it includes a matrix of fine tubes. The fuel enters the 
top of the FOHE and passes through the tubes; the hot oil enters the FOHE main body and 
passes around the fuel tubes. 





The temperature of the fuel after it has passed through the FOHE is considerably 
above its entry temperature. The FOHE filtering matrix consists of over 1,000 small tubes 
(figure 1.7) that are crimped at various locations along their length to improve thermal 
transfer efficiency. The crimps at the inlet of the tubes are to a slightly smaller diameter than 
the remainder of the crimps to prevent small debris becoming lodged in the matrix. The 
tubes protrude by approximately 4 mm from the matrix top plate, which separates the fuel 
from the oil, and therefore extend into the fuel in the inlet chamber. 
Figure 1.7 – Fuel/Oil heat exchanger of Boeing 777 
In the event that the oil becomes too viscous during engine start in cold conditions, 
the FOHE incorporates an oil pressure relief valve to bypass oil away from part of the matrix 
to reduce the time taken to heat the oil to operating temperatures. Under certain conditions 
the fuel flow may not be sufficient to keep the oil temperature within limits and therefore 
cooling is augmented by an Air Oil Heat Exchanger, controlled by the ECS. The low 
pressure filter is mounted directly below and downstream of the FOHE. After the low 
pressure filter, the fuel travels to the high pressure pump of the main engine pumps where 
its pressure is again raised, to the values needed for injection through the fuel spray nozzles 





The main engine pump comprises a centrifugal low pressure stage and a gear-type 
high pressure stage (figure 1.8). Both stages are housed in a single unit, although low 
pressure fuel is passed to the FOHE/low pressure filter unit before being fed back to the 














Figure 1.8 – Main engine pump structural elements 
The pump is driven from the high pressure spool of the engine through the accessory 
gearbox. There are four phosphor-bronze plain bearings which mount the two gears of the 
high pressure stage and these are coated with a dry-film lubricant, although the fuel itself is 
the primary lubricant. The high pressure fuel is ported into the FMU. The FMU contains a 
fuel metering valve, which regulates the fuel flow to match a thrust demand and is 
commanded from the ECS. The FMU is attached to the main engine pump case but is a 
separate unit. The fuel from the FMU is routed to the burners via a flowmeter and a coarse 
high pressure strainer. 
The fuel temperature indication system has a temperature probe located between ribs 
9 and 10 in the left main tank. The probe is situated approximately 12.6 inches above the 





the left wing tank can be slightly colder than the right wing tank. This is because the right 
fuel tank contains two hydraulic fluid/fuel heat exchangers, which are used to cool the 
hydraulic fluid, whereas the left wing has only one. 
Fuel temperature is displayed in white on the primary engine indication and alerting 
system (EICAS). The EICAS low temperature warning trigger automatically defaults to the 
freezing limit of Jet A, unless another temperature, such as the freezing point of Jet A-1, has 
been set in the Flight Management Computer (FMC) Control Display Unit (CDU). Once the 
fuel temperature reaches 3°C above the fuel freezing temperature (-37°C for Jet A and -
44°C for Jet A-1) the fuel temperature indication turns amber and the fuel temp low advisory 
message is displayed on the EICAS.  
On long flights the temperature of the fuel in the main wing tanks will tend towards 
the temperature of the boundary layer around the wing, which can be up to 3°C lower than 
total air temperature. Whilst the cheek tanks of the centre tank are situated in the wings, and 
are affected by aerodynamic cooling, the majority of the centre tank fuel is sandwiched 
between the cabin and the air conditioning packs. Hence the fuel in the centre tank is 
considerably warmer than the fuel in the main tanks. 
The aircraft manufacturer had previously undertaken tests on a B777‑200, which has 
the same wing fuel system as the B777-200ER, to determine the effectiveness of the fuel 
temperature probe. During the test three racks of thermocouples, mounted vertically in the 
tank, were fitted along the span of the left main fuel tank. The test established that there is 
a temperature gradient along the wing span with the coldest fuel inboard and the warmest 
fuel outboard. This gradient occurs because the wing surface to fuel volume ratio results in 
the fuel in the outer sections of the wing cooling at a greater rate than the fuel in the inboard 
sections of the wing. However, a consequence of the wing dihedral and flexing in flight is 
that the cold fuel migrates towards the inboard sections of the wing. A comparison of the 
test data with the actual fuel probe temperatures revealed that there is a close correlation 
between the temperature of the fuel measured by the probe and that measured by the rack of 
thermocouples mounted adjacent to the probe. Engine control is performed by a digital 





on power demands from the thrust levers and from information, including speeds, 
temperatures and pressures, received from sensors on the engine.  
So, briefly understand the operational mission of the main elements of the system we 
can see that in general the fuel system and its components are very reliable integral 
mechanism. Let’s say, that main problem spot of the Boeing-777 in different modifications  
was the FOHE in combination with engine type Rolls-Royce Trent 895-17. After all 
incidents where FOHE was involved main problematic places of this aggregate were 
eliminated and improvements done in next engine generations models what have been 
installed on Boeing-777. Moreover, I would like to represent official reports of the real data 
recordings which were taken after NTSB investigations for better understanding the causes 
of failures or other contributing factors and how is provided the monitoring process of the 
fuel system condition and its components. 
 In accordance with regulatory requirements, the aircraft is equipped with a 25-hour 
duration Flight Data Recorder (FDR) and a 120 minute Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR). The 
aircraft is also tooled up with a Quick Access Recorder (QAR). A comprehensive range of 
parameters (on the example of flight from Beijing to Heathrow airport) was available from 
the FDR and QAR, with just over 1,400 parameters recorded. Salient parameters from the 
FDR and QAR includes (figure 1.9): 
− Fuel temperature within the left main fuel tank (recorded by the FDR at a rate 
of once every 64 seconds and by the QAR at a rate of once every four seconds). 
The temperature is recorded by both FDR and QAR with a resolution of 1°C 
(flight from Beijing to Heathrow airport); 
− Fuel flow delivery to both engines (recorded by both the FDR and QAR at a 
rate of once every second) during any operational phase of the aircraft. A 
smoothing filter is applied to the parameter prior to recording. Unless specified, 
all fuel flows are referenced in their filtered state; 
− Demanded and selected fuel metering valve position for both engines (recorded 
by the QAR once per second); 





− Fuel pump low pressure warnings from all six pumps; two centre fuel tank O/J 
fuel pumps and the left and right main fuel tank forward and aft boost pumps 
(each low pressure warning recorded by the FDR once every four seconds); 
− Left and right engine fuel cutoff valves (recorded by the FDR once per second); 
− Fuel quantity within the centre, left main and right main fuel tanks (recorded 
by the FDR at a rate of once every 64 seconds and by the QAR once every four 
seconds); 
− Fuel Quantity Indication System (FQIS) water detection system. Three 
detectors, one in the centre fuel tank and one in each of the left and right main 
fuel tanks (indications recorded by the FDR once every 64 seconds); 
− Left and right engine oil pressure and oil temperature (recorded by the FDR at 
a rate of once every 64 seconds and by the QAR once every two seconds). 
Brief description of what happened during the approach of the Boeing 777 (flight 
from Beijing to Heathrow airport in 2008) from NTSB and British air accidents investigation 
branch official reports – «Following the reduction in thrust, the autopilot attempted to 
maintain the aircraft on the glideslope. As the airspeed started to decay the autopilot 
compensated by commanding a progressively nose-high pitch attitude. By about 240 ft the 
airspeed had reduced to 115 kt, at which point there was a master caution aural warning, 
indicative of the ‘airspeed low’ warning. This speed was now some 20 kt below the target 
approach speed, at which time the commander selected flap 25. At 200 ft, airspeed had 
reached 108 kt and the stick shaker started to activate as the aircraft neared the stall. Shortly 
afterwards the co-pilot made a nose-down pitch control input which reduced the aircraft 
pitch attitude and automatically disconnected the autopilot. At this time the commander 
made a ‘MAYDAY’ call. The aircraft remained near to the stall and three seconds later it 
impacted the ground at a descent rate of about 1,400 fpm (~25 ft/s) and a recorded peak 





ground, during which time the FDR and CVR records ceased due to a loss of electrical 
power». 
Figure 1.9 – Salient parameters of Boeing- 777 FDR on the example of flight from Beijing 
to Heathrow airport operated by British Airways 
Boeing-777 is also equipped with an Aircraft Condition Monitoring Function 
(ACMF) system. The ACMF is a centralised system designed for the purpose of providing 





records flight data onto a QAR, which is widely used for flight data monitoring, incident 
investigation and maintenance purposes. FDR certification requirements do not apply to 
QAR and ACMF type systems. The QAR is not required to be accident protected and there 
is no requirement governing the use of buffering or the recording of certain parameters. 
Unlike the FDR system, the ACMF may also be readily modified by the operator to suit its 
operational requirements. The ACMF uses buffers so that analysis may be performed on 
data that occurred both before and after an event has been detected. This feature is 
commonly used within the EHM and APM functions. The aircraft manufacturer also used 
a similar feature within the QAR start logic, where data was recorded with a time offset so 
that engine pre-start information could be captured. 
 As a result of investigations and laboratory testings (flight from Beijing to London 
Heathrow) commission established that, under certain conditions, it was possible to partially 
block the FOHE and restrict the fuel flow to the engine HP fuel pump. These restrictions 
were achieved by injecting water directly into the boost pump inlet, leading to a high water 
concentration1 in the fuel. As the water moved through the fuel system it formed ice crystals, 
which subsequently blocked the ends of a majority of the tubes in the FOHE matrix. It was 
established that under certain circumstances 25 ml of water, when introduced into the fuel 
flow in this manner, could form sufficient ice to restrict the fuel flow through the FOHE. 
However, this restriction could always be cleared by reducing the fuel flow, which 
changed the equilibrium between the cold fuel and hot oil in the heat exchanger, such that 
the ice melted on the inlet face of the FOHE sufficient to restore the original fuel flow. 
Variation of the FOHE oil temperature made a small difference to the amount of water 
required to restrict the FOHE, whereas variations in fuel temperature and fuel flow had a 
larger affect. It was concluded that it was not possible to restrict the fuel flow through the 
FOHE when the temperature of the fuel in the main tank was above ‑15°C (at a fuel flow of 
6,000 pph) and ‑10°C (at a fuel flow of 12,000 pph). Moreover, when restricted, the fuel 
flow never dropped below that required by the engine for operation at flight idle. 
The accident flight’s minimum fuel temperature of -34°C was identified as being 





pipes at temperatures between -5°C and -20°C. The rate that ice accumulates will reduce as 
the temperature drops further toward the minimum experienced in flight. Therefore, the 
minimum fuel temperature experienced on the accident flight is not considered a causal 
factor, however it did contribute to the low fuel temperature of -22°C on approach.  
The accident flight had operated for over eight hours in the cruise, at an average fuel 
flow of about 7,000 pph. During the same period, fuel temperatures had remained below -
20°C and, due to the use of the mode for the step climbs, fuel flows had not exceeded 8,897 
pph. Testing has shown that at similar temperatures and flow rates, ice can be formed within 
the fuel feed pipes. Testing has also demonstrated that ice may be released from the fuel 
feed pipes at higher levels of fuel flow, similar to those attained during the final stages of 
the approach when the maximum fuel flow reached 12,288 pph.  
Analysis of 175,000 flights identified that the accident flight was unique among 
35,000 Rolls‑Royce powered flights in having a combination of the lowest cruise fuel flow, 
combined with the highest fuel flow during approach while at the lowest temperature on 
approach. Just two flights from 142,000 Pratt and Whitney powered aircraft flights had these 
features. However, analysis of the N862DA (Delta Airlines case in 2008) incident and 
subsequent data mining identified that this flight was not unique with respect to its 
combination of fuel temperature and fuel flows, although only a relatively small percentage 
(0.3%) of flights shared the same features. 
It is not fully understood why other Rolls‑Royce powered Boeing 777 flights that had 
similar features to the Beijing/Heathrow accident flight, and perhaps more so the N862DA 
incident flight, did not experience similar fuel restrictions. Testing does offer some 
explanation, with the observation of ‘randomness’ in the formation of ice, indicative that 
there may also be a variance in the quantity of ice generated during similar flights. Similarly, 
differences between the Heathrow accident flight and N862DA incident flight, with one 
experiencing a more rapid onset and the other a more progressive restriction, indicate that 
factors other than flow rate and temperature may affect the release of ice from within fuel 
feed pipes. The properties of ice generated within an aircraft, rather than a laboratory 





Although other flights having similar levels of fuel restriction to Heathrow flight and 
N862DA were not discovered, it cannot be ruled out that other aircraft experienced a lower 
level of fuel flow restriction that went undetected. A search of previous ECS Control Loop 
17 occurrences, and an fuel metering valve position algorithm, did not identify any flights 
that had suffered a ‘gross’ mismatch in commanded and actual fuel flow. However, when 
the incident flight of N862DA was analyzed, the fuel metering valve position and expected 
fuel flow algorithm did not detect a mismatch until several minutes after the restriction had 
first started to occur. The ECS control loop 17 also activated some minutes later. Testing 
has shown that ice on the inlet face of the FOHE will clear when the commanded fuel flow 
is reduced to idle thrust. 
 All in all, after all revealed information and testing have shown that ice generated 
within a fuel system may restrict the flow of fuel to the engine such that commanded thrust 
cannot be achieved. There are a number of other scenarios in which commanded thrust may 
not result in the appropriate delivery of fuel to the engine. However, there is no current 
requirement to record parameters which control the delivery of fuel to the engines, such as 
the position of the fuel metering valve. On Beijing to London Boeing-777, the FDR did 
record the loop in control, although this parameter does not reflect the dynamic nature of 
the fuel metering valve nor its immediate position. In this accident (and the incident to 
N862DA), the availability of the fuel metering valve positional information was invaluable 
in being able to determine that the engine control system was functioning correctly and that 
a fuel restriction had occurred, but there is no requirement that this be recorded on the crash-
protected FDR. The required FDR parameters for commercial air transport aircraft are 
provided in ICAO Annex 6 Part 1. This Annex is currently subject to amendment to include 
a wider range of recorded information than is currently prescribed. This enhanced list of 
FDR parameters has already been adopted and implemented by the FAA but not yet by 
EASA. As well as ‘power on each engine’, the proposed change to the Annex details a 
number of examples of ‘additional engine parameters’ to be recorded, including ‘fuel cutoff 
lever position’. For future fuel-flow related investigations it is important that the operational 





this information be required by regulation to be recorded by a FDR. The QAR is recognised, 
by accident investigators and aircraft manufacturers, as providing a valuable source of 
additional information. Unlike the FDR there is no legislative requirement governing the 
buffering of data prior to recording. On many occasions, buffering has not been an issue, 
although during this accident, had the fuel restriction occurred just a few seconds later, the 
accompanying fuel metering valve data from the QAR would not have been available. By 
means of a software update to the ACMF, by the operator, the degree of data buffering of 
QAR data on its Boeing 777 aircraft has been greatly reduced. Other Boeing 777 operators 
have not implemented these changes. 
 Finally, due to analysis of all issued official NTSB reports and investigation data it is 
possible to highlight the main factors which have contributed to the fuel system malfunction: 
− Accreted ice from within the fuel system released, causing a restriction to 
the engine fuel flow at the face of the FOHE, on both of the engines; 
− Ice had formed within the fuel system, from water that occurred naturally in 
the fuel, whilst the aircraft operated with low fuel flows over a long period 
and the localised fuel temperatures were in an area described as the ‘sticky 
range’; 
− The FOHE, although compliant with the applicable certification 
requirements, was shown to be susceptible to restriction when presented 
with soft ice in a high concentration, with a fuel temperature that is below -
10°C and a fuel flow above flight idle; 
− Certification requirements, with which the aircraft and engine fuel systems 
had to comply, did not take account of this phenomenon as the risk was 










 CONCLUSION TO PART 1 
To maintain operational reliability is very complex and vital problem, so using of DTT 
will be an advantage. Nevertheless of rapidly developing in different technologies and already 
present design solutions in aircraft manufacturing this approach with implementation of 
digital model will bring us many useful and practicable during aircraft servicing. 
As a result of the analysis of the operating conditions of the fuel system of the Boeing-
777, the requirements for it, as well as statistical information on its failures and malfunctions, 
it was concluded that the fuel system is one of the most important AC systems on which the 
safety of the AC depends. Therefore, it is necessary to monitor the condition of fuel system 
units and assemblies, to timely detect and prevent their failures and malfunctions, thereby 
maintaining the operational reliability of the fuel system at a high level.  In addition, 
constructive, organizational and technological measures are needed to improve the 
operational reliability of the AC's fuel system. 
From the very beginning of the analysis of faults in the fuel system of the Boeing-777 
in different modifications it can be seen that the malfunction of the FOHE is common and 
repetitive. However, it is also necessary to take into account other outer factors and human 
factor as well. As a result FOHE was later changed and modified by producer. Nonetheless, 
it will be vital necessary to keep the high level of operational reliability of the fuel system in 
the future to minimize or even avoid such situation. All in all, Boeing-777 has fairly good 
instruments of monitoring the fuel system condition, but implementation of DTT without 
doubt will definitely help to improve reliability and tracking of any faults in the future. 















IMPROVEMENTS ON THE FUEL SYSTEM AND IMPLEMENTATION OF DTT 
ON BOEING-777 
2.1 Brief description of the DTT and how it works 
Nowadays it is clearly understandable that issues regarding safety and reliability are 
critical for the aviation industry. For providing a high level of quality and reliability it's 
obligatory to produce quality products and have effective means for maintaining the 
operabilty of all systems and structural units of produced aircraft. Unfortunately, any failure 
or malfunction can lead to fatal incidents and financial reparations for the involved operator 
of the AC. However, it is not only the task of the AC manufacturer. For maintaining of high 
operational reliability value really important have qualified maintenance personnel as well 
as effective MP according to operator requirements accepted by SAA. 
Despite of the modern fleet, more durable turbofan engines and innovations in 
maintenance techniques, recent research has shown maintenance spending stable continues 
to increase. In fact, airlines now spend more money on maintenance than on fuel or crew. 
Nowadays, the need to cut maintenance, repair and overhaul costs is a pressing  and 
important issue for airlines all around the world. Indeed, maintenance is one of the major 
contributors to aircraft operating costs. Flight delays and cancellations from unplanned 
maintenance cost airlines billions of dollars every year — not to mention the distinctly 
impact on customer satisfaction. Because of this, the minimization of operating costs and 
optimization of operational availability continue to be top priorities for airlines. For this, 
actual problem and have analyzed the main problematic spots of Boeing-777, I would like 
to propose an innovative DTT as when in use, will help airlines achieve these aims and 
without doubt increase operational reliability of fuel system. 
Let's briefly look through for the principal scheme of DTT (figure 2.1) and how it 
works. With the help of DTS which will be installed on the aircraft by the producer, digital 





display how the engine is running, conditions of the system, any faults or malfunctions to 
maintenance department of the operator and the manufacturer whilst our aircraft is still in 
the air during any phase of flight. 
Figure 2.1 – Overview of the DTT and principles of its work 
To bring it real, at design stage producer should make an artificial model of the 
Boeing-777 fuel system with thousands of data points specific to each unit and aggregate. 
These are then used to build a digital model of the real physical system that monitors parts 
and unit assemblies in real-time, providing essential information throughout the fuel system 
lifecycle, such as fuel temperature, pressure and other parameters. By implementing DTT 
and creating a virtual model of the system, manufacturer and operator of the AC can receive 
early warnings, predictions or even a plan of action by simulating "what-if" scenarios based 
on weather, other outer factors, performance, operations and other variables, helping keep 
aircraft in service for longer thereby reducing the cost index of maintenance part. Simply 
stated, DTT is a new approach for AC maintenance tasks. Furthermore, it is a good addition 
for the already present ACARS system on modern airplanes including the Boeing-777 





and constant monitoring can optimize maintenance planning and operability by reducing the 
need for routine maintenance. By triggering maintenance when needed − helping for airline 
to increase fleet availability by up to 35% and reduce labor costs by 10%. Nevertheless, one 
of the main probable problems will face manufacturer, is that the storage and analysis of a 
huge amount of data can lead to overload of data storing systems especially if we are talking 
about monitoring of all parameters in real time. Meanwhile, the next generation of cloud 
solutions and improvements in software will solve this problem, which covers all areas from 
predictive maintenance to analysis of operational performance during any phase of flight. 
New cloud solutions are a vital instrument for global development of DTT, especially when 
it concerns about planned and unscheduled maintenance of the airplane. In our time, such 
approach will not only improve the operational reliability of fuel system, but all data which 
obtain producer will be possible to improve component quality or design of released AC. 
Previously airlines have been concerned about the amount of physical hardware they 
might need to adopt new technologies, but the transformation into mobile environment using 
tablets or devices and eliminating the cost of purchasing and managing on premise 
technology is proving to be more convenient and attractive. Exactly adopting of DTT will 
help for the maintenance department of any operator to receive all real data from the aircraft 
fuel system or other structural aggregate simply on their mobile phones or on the tablets via 
special software which has to be developed by the manufacturer. 
As I have mentioned before digital twin is a digital model of a real physical aircraft 
system that transfer the information about internal processes and condition of a real system 
components under the influence of interference and the environment. An important feature 
of the DTT is that the information from the sensors of a real device operating parallel is used 
to assign input influences to it. Operation is possible both online and offline. Moreover, it 
is possible to compare the detectors information of the digital twin model with the sensors 
of a real device, identifying deviations and their causes. The DTT is one of the modern tools 
that allows you to simulate various options for complete and partial failures, the operation 
of structural elements, taking into account their modes of operation, environmental 





Historically, the aviation industry is at the forefront of innovation – many researchers 
confirmed that this field leads to the take-up of new technologies for digital transformation 
to overcome some of the industry’s greatest challenges. It helps to fly more fuel efficiently, 
regularly, and what is not less important – safely. Airlines and worldwide well-known 
aircraft manufacturer companies like Airbus Group, a Boeing company etc. are constantly 
looking for new improvements in operational processes and although some technologies or 
approaches. Regarding that fact that many of them may be at the beginning of their lifespan 
the aviation world is fully aware of the benefits what they will bring. Moreover, when the 
quantity of air travelers (at least before Covid-19 pandemic) is rapidly growing and demand 
for new AC constantly rising (figure 2.2). 
Figure 2.2 – Statistical graph of aircraft deliveries from 1990 till 2015 
2.2 Detailed illustration of Boeing-777 fuel system structure and its main 
components 
For better understanding of how and where it will be possible to install new DTS it is 
probably evident that operator and manufacturer should evaluate the structural components 





and other vital tutorials. In addition to this, some conclusions have to be taken from previous 
incidents what had happened due to failure/malfunction of fuel system or its elements. 
Furthermore, it is important for analyzing of the vulnerable spots in the fuel system structure 
to improve its reliability. Putting it simply, fuel system of any AC is designed to 
accommodate the fuel and feed it to the engines and APU during any phase of flight. The 
fuel system comprises such subsystems, namely: 
− Fuel storage; 
− Pressure refuel; 
− Engine fuel feed; 
− APU fuel feed; 
− Defuel; 
− Jettison; 
− Fuel indicating. 
According to AMM, Boeing-777 has 3 main tanks (left/right/center) with a total 
capacity of 171 200 liters where all fuel is accommodated (figure 2.3) including all unusable 


















Figure 2.3 – Boeing-777 fuel tanks locations and capacity 
Wing ribs divide the fuel tanks into bays, and reduce the movement of fuel during airplane 
maneuvers. Access doors and cutouts are entrances into the airplane fuel tanks for inspection 
or component repair. The center tank is in the center wing section and in the inboard wing 
box of the left and right wings. The left main tank is in the wing box of the left wing. The 
right main tank is in the wing box of the right wing. An adjacent surge tank is outboard of 
each main tank. The wing dry bays are above each engine strut. 
The pressure refuel system transfers fuel from the refuel adapters to the airplane tanks. 
It is possible to operate the pressure refuel system with the integrated refuel panel on the left 
wing. The fuel quantity processor unit and the electrical load management system control 
the system.  
There are two refuel valves in each fuel tank (figure 2.4). In the left main fuel tank, 
the inboard refuel valve actuator is outboard of the main landing gear shock strut. The 
outboard refuel valve is between the fairings of the outboard flap. The refuel valve actuators 
are in similar locations in the right main fuel tank. In the center tank, the left refuel valve 





valve actuator is in a similar location in the right side of the center tank. 
Figure 2.4 – Pressure refuel components locations 
Engine fuel feed − supplies fuel to the engines from the tanks. The engine fuel feed 
system uses these components to supply fuel to the engines: fuel pumps, fuel pump pressure 
switches, crossfeed valves, spar valves. The normal procedure for engine fuel feed operation 
is to supply fuel from the center tank first. When the center tank is empty, you supply fuel 
from the main tanks. If you open a crossfeed valve, you can feed an engine from the opposite 
main tank to correct a fuel imbalance between the main tanks. The engines can also use 
suction feed from a main tank. The engine fuel feed system uses power from the Electrical 
Load Management System (ELMS) and the engine fuel spar valve battery. The engine fuel 
feed system has four boost pumps (figure 2.5). The left forward boost pump receives 115v 
ac power from two sources: the ground service bus or the left transfer bus. The boost pump 
control switch controls power to the pump. A light on the switch shows when there is low 
pressure at the pump outlet. Two pumps are for each main tank. They attach to the rear spar 
of each wing. The forward boost pumps are outboard of each main landing gear shock strut. 
The aft boost pumps are inboard of each main landing gear shock strut. The aft boost pump 
















Figure 2.5 – Structural components of boost pump (example) 
The APU fuel feed system supplies fuel to the APU during APU operation. The 
ELMS supplies power to the APU dc fuel pump and APU fuel shutoff valve. The pump 
operates automatically when the APU selector is in the ON position and there is no pressure 





pump does not operate. The APU fuel feed system can supply fuel to the left engine in the 
air when there is no pressure in the left engine feed manifold and the left engine is not 
operating. The ELMS opens the APU isolation valve and turns on the APU dc fuel pump to 
permit this. The APU fuel feed system has these components (figure 2.6): 
− APU DC fuel pump; 
− APU isolation valve; 
− APU fuel shutoff valve;  
− APU isolation check valve. 
The ELMS automatically controls the APU dc fuel pump and the APU isolation valve. 
When you start the APU on the ground and ac power is not available, the ELMS starts the 
APU dc fuel pump. During flight, if there is an engine flameout, the ELMS can start the 
APU dc fuel pump and open the APU isolation valve. This lets the dc fuel pump supply fuel 
to the left engine when the ac boost pumps do not operate. 
Figure 2.6 – The APU fuel feed system components location 
The defuel system moves fuel from the airplane tanks to refuel station. It also moves 
fuel from one airplane tank into another (tank-to-tank transfer). In general, there are two 
ways to get fuel out of the tanks:  to use the airplane fuel pumps (pressure-defuel) or use 
ground pumps (suction-defuel). The defuel valve connects the engine feed manifold to the 





tubing in the right side of the center tank. The tubing connects to the right engine feed 
manifold and the refuel/jettison manifold. The valve actuator is on the right rear spar. 
The fuel jettison system dumps fuel overboard to reduce the landing weight. It is 
possible to operate the jettison system from the fuel panel on the overhead panel inside the 
cockpit. The ELMS controls the fuel jettison system. There are two override/jettison pumps 
in the center tank and one fuel jettison pump in each main tank. Each pump has a pressure 
switch that sends a signal through the ELMS. The jettison system has these components:    
− Override/jettison pumps; 
− Jettison pumps; 
− Jettison isolation valves; 
− Isolation check valves; 
−  Refuel/jettison manifold; 
−  Jettison nozzle valves. 
There are two override/jettison pumps in the center tank. They are in the left and right 
wheel wells on the rear spar. Fuel jettison pumps are in each main tank. They are on the rear 
spar forward of the flaperons. There is one fuel jettison isolation valve in each section of 
the center tank. The valve actuators are on the rear spar just outboard from the fuselage. 
These are the same kind of valve as the other motor-actuated valves in the fuel system. There 
is a jettison isolation check valve in each section of the center tank. The valve prevents fuel 
jettison by the left and right main tank fuel boost pump. The jettison pumps supply fuel from 
the main tank to the refuel/jettison manifold during fuel jettison. The jettison pumps can 
supply fuel at a pressure of 36 psi and a flow rate of 70,000 pounds (31750 kg) per hour. 
Each pump assembly has a motor-impeller and a housing. 
Fuel indicating − measures fuel quantity in the tanks, fuel temperature, senses fuel 
pump outlet pressure, controls refuel operations, shows when there is water in the tanks with 
the help of special aggregates. These are the fuel quantity indicating system components: 
tank units, densitometers, water detectors, fuel temperature sensor, wiring harnesses, fuel 
quantity processor unit.  





− Tank units (60); 
− Densitometers (3); 
− Water detectors (3); 
− Temperature sensor. 
Figure 2.6 – Fuel tank sensors types and their location 
The EICAS display shows total fuel quantity and fuel temperature in the lower right 
corner of the EICAS display. The fuel synoptic display shows individual tank quantities and 
the total fuel quantity. It also shows the fuel temperature and the minimum fuel temperature. 
The minimum temperature is 3℃ more than the freeze temperature. 
 As we can see the fuel system of Boeing-777 is a complex unit with a sophisticated 
set of structural components where each aggregate has a determined purpose and 
responsibility for its own functions.  However, almost all principal units and parts are the 
same as other models of airplanes. All in all, the aircraft fuel system is a vitally important 





2.3 Brief description of the DTS and its principles of operation 
For understanding how exactly this sensor will be implemented on AC it is 
necessary to evaluate which exact data will be monitored and get as much as possible 
technical data of the DTS. As a fuel system is a complex system, we need an enhanced 
digital twin model (according to digital twin classification) from the manufacturer whilst 
the mounting of a set DTS. 
Analytics for predicting failures and maintaining automated, live, up-to-date asset 
health scores usually requires data from multiple modalities. The modalities of DTS may 
include: 
− Parametric data ( temperature, pressure); 
−  Spectral sensors (raman spectroscopy); 
− Image Sensors ( infrared imaging, visible light cameras); 
− Free text data (manufacturer comments from service records or other forms 
of communication); 
− Structured database tables (Maintenance databases). 
As we can see, the DTS is able to handle data from multiple modalities in a seamless and 
most efficient way, delivering best-in-class performance using the latest techniques. 
Representations used to combine information from different modalities and provide new 
information not possible from each individual source. 
 For example, the condition assessment of a jettison isolation valve may use sensor 
data on flow, input pressure, output pressure along with data from an infra-red sensor 
inspection equipment and also needs to take into account all the text input from 
maintenance records. The problem is similar for predicting the failure of key components 
in a boost pump or the rest components of the fuel system. Advanced DTS technologies 
for fuel system and its aggregates health monitoring can help identify issues at a different 
stage of a problem developing fuel system health monitoring uses magnetic sensing 
technologies to monitor fuel flow inside the pipelines and between the connection to boost 





and resonance in real-time to provide estimates of individual pipeline health. In addition, 
this approach can be used to improve boost pump health monitoring, FOHE condition, 
fuel quality, temperature, etc. Nonetheless, the major problem is that aviation fuel is a 
liquid, and the presence of water is an indivisible part of this substance. It is very 
important to monitor not only the quantity of water inside the fuel but also the operation 
conditions of elements that providing heating, delivering, and feeding engines. 
Analyzing all mentioned before it will be logically to emphasize the main 
advantages of DTS (figure 2.7) : 
 Gives more precise information that already present sensors about 
temperature variations and outer aerodynamic loads during different 
operating modes of the engines; 
 Availability to measure a big quantity of physical parameters under certain 
extreme conditions; 
 Low level of malfunction and high operational reliability; 
 The light mass of the whole sensor gives us relatively low weight loss; 
 Small dimensions give us convenient methods of mounting onto the pipeline 
and we do not need to globally change the system; 
 Very high level of durability and wearаbility; 
 Better understanding of operating conditions and capabilities, resulting in 
improved system safety and lower application of resources; 













Figure 2.7 – Sample of one of the types DTS 
In fact, the entire sensor is a microscopic product, enclosed in a triangle of 
approximately 1.5 cm on the 50 µm side. Moreover, this sensor possible to apply in different 
fields of human activity and industry. For simple example implementation of the DTS in 
engine component testing, the sensor can provide minimally intrusive performance for 
advanced engines, materials, and components in extreme, high-temperature environments, 
propulsion system validation, and experimental verification of computational models. 
2.4 Calculation of DTS reliability  
The operating time for failure of the DTS , obtained on the basis of the collection 
and analysis of statistical data during testing and from working cycles already mounted 
on other systems, is: 
ti = {0,57; 0,82; 0,93; 1,08; 1,21; 2,22; 3,80; 4,14; 6,72; 8,0}, m = 10; 
Estimated coefficient of variation of data v = 0,4; 
Limit relative error d = 0,15; 
Trust probability q = 0,85; 
Number of degrees of freedom К = 1. 
The law of distribution of the DTS operating time for failure - Weibull, the law of 
distribution of elimination time of the DTS - normal. 













                                                     (2.1) 
 
(1,77 2,02 3,63 5,08 7,21 10,22 12,80 14,14 16,72 18,0)
9,159
10


















                                               (2.2) 
       
 
2 2 2 2
1,77 9,159 2,02 9,159 3,63 9,159 5,08 9,159
10 1
2 2 2 27,21 9,159 (10,22 9,159) (12,80 9,159) (14,14 9,159)
2(16,72 9,159) (18,0 9,159
6,065
       
 

        










    
T Т Т Т
m mi ma md max ;
Т Т
m m
   
  
  
                                       (2.4) 
 
9,159 1,77 18 9,159
; 0,807; 0,965 0,965
9,159 9,159
d max max  
  
   
 
 
Since the coefficient of variation ν = 0,662 less than the specified (0,7), аnd  dmax 
= 0,965 > 0,2, then we accept the final value of the test volume N = 40. 
Taking into account the fact that there are six DTS on the airplane, the number of observed 
AC should be at least 20. 
Estimate of the Weibull distribution parameters 
To estimate the parameters of the Weibull distribution a and b, we use the method 
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Thus, the Weibull distribution parameters:  
a = 42,852 
b = 1,120 
Evaluation of reliability indicators 
Assessment of reliability indicators of the integral section: 
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In order to collect data on the reliability of the DTS, a surveillance plan is chosen, 
involving unlimited monitoring of 60 DTS (20 AC).  
According to the data obtained during the implementation of the observation plan, 
it is determined that the time between failures of the DTS has a Weibull distribution with 
parameters:  
a = 42,852 
b = 1,120 
The obtained values of the distribution parameters allowed us to estimate the 
probability of failure of the sensors and the mean time between failures:  
42,214T   
( ) 0 163q t ,=  
Thus it can be seen that the failures of the DTS occur periodically, most often the 
electrical part fails. Therefore, it is necessary to develop a procedure for replacing the 
sensor, which allows reducing the labor capacity and the time of servicing the fuel system 
of the Boeing-777 in different modifications. 
2.5 Calculation of the efficiency of the fuel system with installed DTS and with 
implementation of DTT. 
Calculation of leakage in the slot seals in a boost pumps of the impeller. 
у 95mmD   - packing diameter; 
Radial gap in the slot: 
3 3
у10 10 95 0,095mmδ D





but   should not be less than 0,2 mm [13], therefore we take 0,2mm  ; 
Calculation of leakage: 
2
y y y
Q D gH= mp d                                              (2.14) 
where: 
y
H  - differential pressure on the seal; 






















































V  - circumferential component of the absolute flow velocity at the outlet of the 










U = w  and yy
2
D
U = w  - portable velocities at corresponding radii; 
g
h  - The efficiency of the boost pump can be determined from the empirical formula 
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Where С - clearance length, 8mm;С   
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V    ; 
2g
0 у
V H   - flow velocity in the gap; 
In the first approximation we take 0,6  , then: 
0 0,6 2 9,81 31,2 14,8 /V m s    ; 
  - coefficient of friction resistance for pipelines, we take in accordance with the 
Reynolds number: 
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In the second approximation: 
0 0,76 2 9,81 31,2 18,8 /V m s    ; 
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In the third approximation: 








































 ;    =>   0,79  ,    whence 
31017,12,3181,920002,0095,014,379,0 yQ . 
For sealing between stages: 
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In the first approximation we take 6,0 , then: 







































In the second approximation: 
0 0,75 2 9,81 11,52 11,27 /V m s    ; 
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According to obtained results, efficiency of fuel system operation is much greater 
than the generally accepted operational efficiency without implementation of DTT and 
mounted DTS: =0,9 %. 
2.6 Increasing operational efficiency and reliability of the fuel system due to 
installation of DTS and involvement of DTT on Boeing-777 
In general, DTT in the aviation industry is already doing their job. For example, 
digital twins of equipment and predictive analytics reduce fleer downtime by up to 12% 
increasing the efficiency of the fuel system, when designing digital twins, they reduce the 
time spent on the process by up to 30%, and the rate of personnel training using digital twin 





adapting to faster conditions that increase the efficiency and effectiveness of funds that 
directly affect their competitiveness. 
DTS for advanced aeronautical and aerospace research applications must be capable 
of operating in environments where stress and temperature gradients and aerodynamic 
factors are high, or sensors must be kept to a minimum. The multifunctional thin-film sensor, 
developed at NASA's Glenn Research Center, integrates into smart sensor designs for 
sensors that measure: 
 the magnitude and direction of deformation stress; 
  heat flow; 
 surface temperature; 
 speed and direction of flow. 
The entire sensor is a microscopic product, enclosed in a triangle with an area of 
approximately 1.5 cm on the side with a thickness of 50 μm. Designed for applications, 
material systems and engine component testing, the sensor can provide minimally intrusive 
performance for advanced engines, materials and components in hostile, high-temperature 
environments, propulsion system validation, and experimental verification of computational 
models. 
DTT system allows for: 
 automatic detection and correction of drift in the Digital Twin; 
  adaptation to changing conditions, both locally (for the asset) and globally 
(for all assets); 
  highest performance levels when predicting future observations of the fuel 
system condition has a unique ability to build and update models using 
Artificial Intelligence that searches through model libraries to identify the 
best performing models.  
This method uses a Genetic algorithm-based evolutionary search algorithm that 
searches through various Classification, Regression, Clustering, and Physics-based models 





of the physical assets. In addition, transfer learning and active learning techniques are 
applied where domain knowledge and human guidance is required during the model 
updating process. This approach allows for rapid model development and continuous model 






CONCLUSION TO PART 2 
As it is shown the implementation of DTT will play a very important role in the 
lifecycle of the aircraft fuel system and in servicing works. But the realization of this 
technology needs enough investments and innovative cloud infrastructure. So, that’s where 
DTT really comes up and proves that it is capable to improve maintenance and diagnostic 
processes in the modern aviation field especially in the decreasing of the maintenance cost, 
conveniently in control of all parameters remotely at any time, even from mobile devices, 
improvement of fault earlier detection and statistical reports which help to construct an 
appropriate servicing program of the fuel system. It also can increase mission reliability, 
extend the duration of life-limited components, and of course increase maintenance quality, 
without compromising any safety or reliability issues. 
A digital twin monitoring system would immediately have a beneficial impact on 
safety as well as cost savings for airplane operators. First and foremost, having an accurate 
and reliable digital twin system will better ensure the safety of the aircraft. The system of 
sensors can be placed in the most remote and hard to inspect areas of the fuel system 
providing detailed information in fully automatic comparison with artificial analog with the 
help of wireless connection. The DTT will show the possibility of eventual failure, even 





Analysis of the standard maintenance procedures on the example of Boeing-777 was 
made. We considered most frequent failures, typical servicing works with units of fuel 
system. The obtained results demonstrate that fuel system failures are occurring relatively 
often in case of huge necessity of human resource and non-opportunity of remote prediction 
of any system faults in different flight modes. So the implementation of the DTT is highly 
recommended. This system will allow monitoring and predicting failures before they can 





ANALYSIS AND OPTIMIZATION OF THE DTT DESIGN 
3.1. Possible locations of DTS 
The constantly expanding variety of different sensors including DTS demonstrates 
difficulties in resolving the contradiction between the requirements of the economy and 





accomplished calculations of failure rate, it will be logically demonstrating the possible 
design of DTS likely locations in fuel system structure (figure 3.1). 
Figure 3.1 – Scheme of the fuel system with location of DTS 
Thus, the proposed places of location of the DTS aimed at eliminating the 
shortcomings of existing problems and increasing operability of the fuel system will 
increase its level of operational reliability. The DTS takes into account not only a large 
number of factors but also the relationship between them. Therefore, it is excellent for the 
complex system in the process even if we are talking about the operation at high altitudes. 
Moreover, the DTT leverages advances in Artificial Intelligence (AI) in several ways that 
make it scalable for future challenges and growth: 
 new AI technology is addressing the massive amounts of unstructured data 
that enterprises must deal with in the lifecycle of a part and asset. It is 
estimated that 80% of all data will continue to be unstructured, and AI 
enables machines to read and understand diverse data, connecting to 
common and shared semantics, and finding mistakes and quality issues 
that can be automatically correctly; 
  semi-automation is provided by AI and integration of complex tasks like 
configuring models and analytics, and understanding error progation 
through systems of models. 
Airlines and operators who understand how analytics and data can help them finally 
control their operations, financial decisions and maintenance works to a level not yet seen 
understand the competitive and business growth advantages of the Digital Twin. 
3.2 Material and structural components of DTS 
Fiber Bragg grating (FBG), which is an in-fiber component, consists of a periodic 
modulation of the index of refraction along the fiber core, as shown in figure 3.2, FBG 
functions like a filter when a broad-band light is transmitted into the fiber core, reflecting 







Figure 3.2 — Schematic diagram of Fiber Bragg Gratings 
When there is a force exerted on the FBG, it will compress or expand, thus the 
grating spectral response is changed. 
In order to be able to use a network of FBG sensors in a wide range of situations, the 
preferred choice would be a system with a scan rate variable in the required range. The scan 
rate should also be related to the high number of sensors that is usually required for high-
spatially-resolved structural monitoring. Furthermore, in order to comply with aerospace 
requirements, the interrogation system should be light, small, low-power consuming and 
immune to electromagnetic interference. 
The interrogation systems that have been developed to date are usually suitable for 
different measurement frequency ranges. The simplest available FBG interrogator is the 
conventional optical spectrum analyser, which is however cumbersome, costly and offers 
only low speed scanning. Below 1 kHz, it is possible to use tunable Fabry-Perot filters to 
realise wavelength sweeping by means of mechanical moving parts. For measurements from 
1 kHz to 20 kHz, a combination of a CCD array and a diffractive grating has proved 
effective. Instead between 20 and 500 kHz, primarily three methods have been reported in 
the literature: the use of a laser diode with output wavelength centred in the middle of 
spectrum; a Fabry-Perot filter with a broadened and fixed spectrum; and an arrayed 
waveguide grating (AWG) with fixed spectrum. Of these, the concepts of laser diode and 
arrayed waveguide grating are the most reliable. If the laser diode is replaced by a tunable 
laser source, it becomes possible to operate the interrogator in the wavelength-sweeping 





operate the system simultaneously in the two modes. Instead, an AWG, the core device used 
for wavelength division multiplexing (WDM) in optical communication systems, can be 
used to overcome this problem; it has already been used successfully for the interrogation 
of FBG sensors. Unlike systems based on a laser diode or a tunable laser source, the AWG-
based system can achieve both high resolution and broad range, thus enabling both high 
speed and accurate monitoring of quasi-static strains. In addition, this type of system is 
lightweight and can be miniaturised. 
Recently, was developed a wavelength interrogation system based on an Echelle 
diffractive grating (EDG), which deploys planar light wave circuits technology offering the 
same functionality as an AWG. The interrogation system based on EDG is capable of 
achieving a wavelength resolution of less than 1 pm with a measurement accuracy of ±10 
pm and a scan rate of 300 kHz. Both low and high scan rate are provided, by using dedicated 
channels. In the “sweeping mode”, the transmission wavelength of the EDG channel is tuned 
by adjusting the EDG chip temperature allowing load monitoring, while in the “parked 
mode” the transmission wavelength of all EDG channels is fixed and can be used for damage 
detection. 
Besides universities and research centers, a number of companies have also been 
developing novel interrogation systems, which in some cases are already available on the 
market. In particular, three novel solutions have been proposed recently by industry. A 
lightweight, high-speed and self-powered fibre optic sensor system based on the use of 
monolithic photonic integrated circuit (PIC) microchip technology in order to integrate and 
miniaturise the optical and optoelectronic components; reportedly the system is capable of 
measuring static and dynamic data over a range of ±4000 µε, at sampling frequencies of up 
to 500 kHz, therefore being suitable for the real time detection of operating load, fatigue and 
damages. Parallel processing interrogator that allows massive multiplexing of a high number 
of FBG sensors sampled at high rates. Groups of up to 16 sensors can be sampled 
simultaneously up to 1 MHz on a single fibre with the capability of switching between 
multiple fibres in the kHz range. Also in this case, the solution allows for smart composite 





frequency acoustic emission (AE) monitoring and Lamb-wave based damage detection. In 
recent years, NASA and the company 4DSP LLC have collaborated on the design of a 
commercially available, quasi-distributed, fibre-optic-based system for gathering large 
amounts of data from massive multiplexing of FBG sensors at a high sampling rate with 1 
µε resolution this instrument uses a tunable laser source and a Michelson interferometer to 
interrogate up to 64 separate sensors arrays, each comprising up to 2000 sensors located 
along a fibre cable with a length of up to approximately 24 m. The interrogation algorithm 
can support a 100 Hz sweep capability, making the system suitable for highly spatially 
resolved measurements of the aircraft structural shapes. 
Finally, it is worth mentioning a recent strategy for FBG sensor interrogation that 
addresses the lack of robustness associated with multiplexing FBG sensors in one or more 
fibre arrays.  
In order to overcome this lack of redundancy, Wild developed a sensing architecture 
called Distributed Optical Fibre Smart in which a large number of Smart Transducer 
Interface Modules are positioned at the nodes of an all-fibre sensor network for the 
simultaneous distribution of sensing, power and communication. 
While structural health monitoring using fiber Bragg sensors is promising and has been 
used successfully in several applications, there are still some challenges and questions that 
need to be resolved before implementation of such a system would be possible. Fiber sensors 
need to be proven to be durable and reliable for the life and operating conditions of the 
structure, especially where the fibers are embedded in the structure and cannot be replaced. 
Similarly for sensors bonded on the outside of the structure, that bond must be durable for 
the life of the structure in order for the system to function properly. 
There are numerous benefits to use fiber Bragg sensors as a structural health 
monitoring system. The fibers are light, small, and geometrically flexible allowing them to 
fit into tight spaces without interfering with the structure. Fiber Braggs are immune to 
electromagnetic interference, radio frequency interference, radiation, corrosion, and can be 
safely used in high temperature and explosive environments. Fiber Bragg sensors can be 





lightning strike considerations. With multiplexing, a single fiber can measure hundreds of 
points with sub millimeter resolution. The sensors have a high bandwidth, can measure 
multiple parameters simultaneously, have a low signal to noise ratio, and show little 
deterioration over time. Fiber sensors have the capability of being bonded externally to 









CONCLUSION TO PART 3 
In the 3rd part it was expected that implementing of the structural health monitoring 
system is highly important. Also the layout of the sensors and the network system were 
proposed. There are a lot of benefits of such technology. First of all it allows to perform 
constant monitoring of the state of the structure. Secondly it can determine the damage or 
crack propagation at its very first stages which allows to perform repair works very quickly 
without letting the damage to spread further. Also such network allows quick access 
diagnostics for regular technicians as well as extended mode for certified engineeres to 
perform deeper investigation of the damage and crack propagation.  
Fiber Bragg sensors were choosen as the most optimal variant due to their simple 
principle of work, ability to work in both directions, compression and extension and also 
their resistance to numerous harmful factors.  The most suitable for FBG sensor location is 
joining area between composite body shell and underframe, because this is the most stressed 
parts of the fuselage. This technology is relatively new on the market but it constantly 





The direct cost benefits from implementing such system are obvious. An online 
system would reduce (and ideally eliminate) the need for time based inspections, so the labor 
and man-hours associated with visual and nondestructive inspection and 
disassembly/reassembly can be eliminated. An additional direct cost associated with current 
commercial aviation practices is the removal and replacement of undamaged or slightly 
damaged parts prior to the end of their useful life. Indirect cost benefits from an online 
structural health monitoring system are also varied. The greatest, benefit is that the airplane 
structure can be used to its full lifetime, which, by necessity, is longer than the current design 
lifetime. Transport airplanes could continue to fly for as long as it is economical, knowing 







4.1 Factors with adverse contributing effect that are in place for the operation 
and repair of the Boeing-777 AC fuel system  
First of all, requirements for maintenance of the fuel system of the AC must be 
observed in accordance with the rules of «Actions of safety features at working places 
during maintenance procedures» (ССБТ. ГОСТ 12.0.230.2-2015). There are some set of 
operational hazards which can occur during maintenance of the AC fuel system: 
− increased of dust and gas contamination in the service area;  
− harmful products of engine exhaust gases and liquids with hazardous content 
from vessels and AC pipelines what experience pressure loads;  
− non-regulated noise, vibrations;  
− dimmed lightning places where maintenance procedures conducting; 
− decreased or even increased values of temperatures of any AC, material 





− self-driven machinery, vehicles of special demands and purposes for other 
vehicles; 
− edges with sharp angles with different roughness; 
− insufficient delivery of natural light;  
− developing of shock wave (explosion, vapors from flammable fluids);  
− highly positioned AC parts with complicated access to them; 
− high level of static electricity; 
− presence of hazardous chemical components that are residuals or the main part 
in percentage of fuel and lubricants; 
− real danger for inadvertently slip (due to icing, humidification at high level of 
the surfaces of AC, ladders and coverings of parking places);  
− tools and materials for maintenance of AC which can fall and damage structural 
parts of the aircraft likely stabilizer, fuselage frame and when at height 
conducting the maintenance using mechanized lifts;  
− any part of the constructions (production tools and equipment, side staircases 
or simple stairs). 
In fact, there are many hazardous contributing factors at any producing or repairing 
organization. So, it is necessary to evaluate all negative moments before involving of any 
labour precaution actions. If an employee field of work out of the airport buildings, the noise 
level should not exceed 50 dB. Furthermore, workers who zone o responsibility located in 
the production area of the airport, including on-site parking of AC, the apron, and the noise 
level should not exceed 85 dB according to the "Safety Rules for Maintenance and 
Maintenance of Aviation Equipment":  
− humidity increasing about 70 %;  
− level of humidity reduction to 30 %;  
− workplaces new location at a height of 1 m relative to the ground surface (for 





4.2 Technological measures aimed to reduce the level of exposure to hazardous 
and harmful production factors during operating the fuel system of an AC 
In this part I would like to overview technological measures what are proposed to 
reduce the hazardous and harmful production factors arising from various forms of 
maintenance of the AC system.  
Simply stated that can be different variations of this problem but to attain some level 
of exposure to hazardous and harmful production factors reduction it is necessary to use 
useful methodological bases. Hygienic standards in the parameters of the microclimate in 
the working area are given in Interstate standard due to ГОСТ 12.0.230.2-2015 («General 
sanitary and hygienic requirements for the air of the working area»). Working area should 
extend at least for up to 2 m above the floor or ground, where all maintenance procedures 
were planned to conducted. Permanent jobs is considered, that job when we can make an 
assessment more than half of whole time, or more than 2 hours continuously. Additionally, 
these restrictions haven’t to be hesitated because with increasing of some incapacitation 
increases effectiveness of committed works. Working in different places n different time 
arrangements, then it's all think of permanent jobs.  
Finally, to prevent or reduce the impact of hazardous and harmful production some 
actions have to be provided and the following activities have been developed:  
− briefing conducting for drivers special transport with basic traffic rules and 
access to the AC;  
−  the speed of movement of special vehicles and self-propelled vehicles in the 
parking areas and on the platform should be no more than 20 km / h. At the 
entrance to the serviced AC, before reaching it - 10 m the driver is obliged to 
stop the car and start the approach at a speed of no more than 5 km / h under 
the direction of the official currently responsible for the AC; 
− for the maneuvering of special vehicles there are one-way gates with a width 
of 3.5 m;  
− to reduce the dustiness of the working area in the open area, it is envisaged to 
use special machines that clean the soil with a strong stream of water, in 





− on the platform, in the hangar there are sources of artificial lighting;  
− portable electric lamps with a voltage of 28 V;  
− when working on caissons-tanks, portable explosion-proof lamps with a 
voltage of 28 V;  
− for the removal of static electricity in the hangar and in the parking lot of the 
AC installed wells, for grounding AC;  
− in order to reduce the influence of noise from running engines, when it is 
necessary to check the tightness of the fuel system, it is envisaged to use anti-
noise headphones;  
− in order to reduce toxic fumes of fuel (the maximum permissible concentration 
is 300 mg/m3), when working in fuel tanks, mandatory use of personal 
protective equipment of respiratory organs;  
− in works related to open fuel volumes, special silicate ointments are used to 
protect open parts of the body;  
− when working on high-lying parts of the power plant, tools and equipment are 
located on the staircases in the sorts, so that they do not fall and injure 
maintenance personnel;  
− for eliminating of the increased pollution, stands are periodically cleaned of 
dirt, ice, snow, and also the using of specially designed footwear is obligatory;  
− system of ventilation of the AC hangar uses the circulation of warm dry air in 
the winter and cold in the summer.  
Main idea is to create a healthy environment in the maintenance zones of the fuel 





4.3 Calculation of ventilation of the hangar when servicing the Boeing-777  
Hangars are used to service the fuel conditioning system. Since the fuel is less harmful 
to human health, the evaporator should be equipped with ventilation. 
The amount of fresh air required to dilute harmful emissions to an acceptable 










3600 [m3/hour],                                 
(4.1) 
where     μ = 1 - Supply air flow coefficient for rectangular opening;     
А – area of supply air holes, m2; 
g = 10,81 – acceleration of gravity, m/с2; 
γн = 9,25 – specific gravity of air, N/m
3; 
Н - thermal head, Pа.  
 
To obtain some measurements data of the area of the supply holes we should 
determine the overall space of the hangar.  
Hangar area is determined like digit based on the geometric dimensions of the AC  
- Length of AC L = 51 m;  
- Wingspan Lк = 34 m.  
Distance between AC to the wall of the hangar should be at least - 6 m for special 
vehicle corridors and stairs. The distance between the extreme points of the wings must be 
at least - 10 m.  
 Area according to data of intake openings: 
А = 2225 = 100 (m2). 
 
Obtained area: 
baS  (m2),                                                 (4.2) 
72009080 S (m2). 
Sizing holes dimensions м22 ; Number of holes 29.  
The thermal head is generated in the chamber due to the difference in the specific 





 внhН   [Pа],                              (4.3) 
Where h - height between the centers of the fence and the outlet, m; 
γн, γв - specific gravity of air inside and outside the room, N/m
3. 

























3600 1 100 0,5 ,
12,25
3250452 m / h .
Q
Q   
 
    

 
Having obtained the required pressure and efficiency of the fan, we chose the fan. 











Selection of the fan motor. 
Statistical power of the electric motor is represented by the formula: 
                                              𝑁 =
H×Q×B
3600×102×ℎ
  [kW],                                                (4.4) 
where В = 3,1 - coefficient of power. 
𝑁 =
0,5 ⋅ 240452 ⋅ 3,1
3400 ⋅ 122 ⋅ 0,55
= 8,7 
Optimizing features of the fan blades to the corresponding motor with rated power 
with a safety margin about 5 %: 





It gives us a such conclusion that calculated ventilation parameters of the determined 
hangar ensures that maintenance personnel are performing safely in maintenance of the two 
of Boeing-777 AC fuel systems. 
4.4 Fire and explosive safety in the working area of AC maintenance  
All issues closely connected with an explosive safety of civil aviation enterprises is 
carried out in accordance with suitable documentation and resolutions on fire protection of 
enterprises, organizations and institutions of civil aviation. Moreover, maintaining of high 
level of explosive safety is the main task of any operator of organization providing 
scheduled maintenance.  
Putting it simply, it describes that the main provisions for the organization of fire 
prevention work, service and training of fire units at the enterprises of the SAA, as well as 
duties of officials to ensure fire safety at the facilities and all buildings of the civil aviation 
enterprises. According to the "Instruction of the Safety Rules for Maintenance and Current 
Repair of Aviation Equipment", when servicing the fuel system to the occurrence of a fire 
or explosion, the following factors:  
− it is necessary to exclude the influence on the operating jets of the liquid under 
pressure, when the fuel system of the engine is spilled to prevent fuel spillage 
on the engine parts and the AC parking stand;  
− hot structural components fuel ingression, electrical wiring;  
− ignition sources with spilled fuel;  
−  disruption of metallization to remove electrical discharge during refueling;  
−  sparks from impact and friction, when the instrument falls;  
− rigid violation of fire safety requirements (smoking at not designated for this 
purpose places, availability of open fire sources).  
The following activities in my diploma program were developed: 
− in order to prevent fire and fight it in maintenance areas, a fire protection panel 





−  сarbon dioxide, powder fire extinguishers, shovels, hooks, fire extinguishers, 
sand containers; 
− in the hangar there are both portable and stationary fire protection methods. 
− AC input into the hangar is performed no earlier than - 20 minutes after the 
engine has stopped; 
− the whole AC in the hangar is installed in such a way that one of the AC can 
be freely withdrawn; 
− when AC is introduced into the hangar for a day or more, the fuel from the tank 
will merge and the tank will be filled with inert gas; 
− in the place where there is an increased fire hazard, use a hand foam fire 
extinguisher, for example. 
− Personnel protection features from the fire hazard against it in the areas where 
maintenance is provided, fire protection panels are installed. 
Dangerous, for firefighting and vulnerable for explosive safety are:  
− airplane fuel tanks;  
− general power plant compartments;  
− technical compartments including aft and rear parts;  
− panels of AC generators;  
− compartments for luggage hold;  
− hot Air Pipeline Laying Area.  
According to the "Instruction of labor safety rules for maintenance and current repair 
of aviation equipment" the fire safety of the is provided by the fire protection system.  
Prevention of fire is achieved:  
 
− technological processes automatization and hazards risks avoiding connected with 
work combustible substances using of fireproof materials for cabin crew and 





− pressurized compartments including ambient air probably gives cooling of both the 
engine parts and the aggregates inside of them, comprising the possibility of removing 
and minimizing the quantity from fuel vapors;  
− involvement of electrical equipment concerned with the main task of fire and 
explosion risks in accordance with the requirements of the "Rules for the installation 
of electrical installations».  
− fire protection provides: compartments for luggage hold, the use of fire extinguishing 
means and appropriate types of fire equipment tools, application of automatic fire 
alarm and fire extinguishing systems.  
4.5 Instruction for the implementation of the rules for maintenance of labor 
protection 
To ensure the safety of people working with AC, the following rules must be 
observed:  
− persons without access to the working areas where risks of fire and explosive 
are high with a list of task cards work are prohibited;  
− the parking brakes of Boeing-777 should not be released even after works 
finishing. AC is obligatory to equip with reliable grounding devices;  
− all AC  distance in one row between other AC must meet the requirements of 
airport and the operator;  
− it is forbidden to ignore safety measures during operation of the AC and 
overheat or somehow damage the electrical components, units and ignore 
overheating indication if it was triggered;  
− all maintenance procedures in areas of increased fire hazard, it is obligatory to 
have with you a spark-free instrument;  
−  aerodrome territory must be fire protected as much as possible, especially in 
the areas of AC par stands, protected from debris, oiled rags, dry grass and 
other combustible substances and materials;  
−  after removing the equipment and units, the plug-in connectors must be closed 





− the state of the ATC electrical network should be checked at least twice a year; 
− work on painting, washing and engine washing is necessary on-site only for 
this purpose; 
− before adding AC oil, it is necessary to remove static electricity from the filler 
neck; 
− when filling up the fuel in the open, it is forbidden to drain the landing fuel; 
− integrity of psi fire extinguishers must be in operational condition and stored 
in the designated area. 
During maintenance of substations in open areas and in places it is strictly forbidden: 
− smoking and the use of open fire is closer than - 25 meters from substations 
and other fire hazardous areas; 
−  work beginning and initiating without checking AC grounding, availability 
and serviceability of fire extinguishing methods; 
− it accepts AC of special vehicles without fire, grounding and sparking 
methods; 
− defective electric heating and lighting equipment are used; 
− сarry out painting, washing and engine washing in places without equipment; 
− within - 3 hours after the end of the colorful work with the appearance of a 
spark; 
− when launching the AC engine in front of the leaked fuel; 
− store containers with combustible materials, solder, incinerator and grass at a 
distance from the AC and the manufacturing plant closer to the rule; 
− when the AC is filled with fuel, repairs and checks are performed on the radio 
and electrical equipment as a whole, on-board network, battery replacement, 
AC engine heating, connection of electrical power sources; 
− storage in sheds, docks, flammable and combustible liquids, flames, oxygen 
tanks, oiled rags, motor vehicles; 






− drain the oily products on soil or in unsuitable containers; 
− when working indoors, electric wires are laid on the route of transporting the 
internal horn. 
Practical usage of fire extinguishing equipment for purposes not related to fire 
fighting. In the event of a fire, it is necessary to report this to the duty officer of the airline 






CONCLUSION TO PART 4 
 
Based on the analysis of hazardous and harmful production factors during 
maintenance of the AC fuel system, measures have been developed to improve the safety 
of long-range maintenance and operation of the Boeing-777 AC. 
One of the important moments in improving the efficiency of aviation is the 
development of the competence of aviation personnel, the development and 
implementation of modern maintenance and repair programs and new technologies for 
the operation of the Air Force, which require the development of new approaches. , rules 
























CHAPTER 5 ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 
5.1 Boeing-777 fuel system operation danger analysis 
Today, environmental protection is one of the most important problems for humanity. 
The general objective of environmental protection is effective measures aimed at 
maintaining the cleanliness of the environment in human settlements and improving the 
efficient use of natural resources. In civil aviation operational companies, the main area of 
action to reduce environmental impact is as follows:  
− total reduction of emissions of untreated sewage and harmful emissions 
in the territory of aerodromes;  
− reduction of air pollution by harmful substances from AC power plants 
аnd ground vehicles;  
− exclude the аnnoying effect of аviation and other industrial noise;  
− protection from the impаct of electric fields, wаste disposаl of the 
аctivities of airlines.  
Harmful combustion products for aviation fuels in AC and special vehicle engines 
include carbon monoxide, non-combustible carbon, nitrogen and sulfur oxides, soot and 
soot. To prevent soil contamination during fuel system maintenance, tanks have been 
placed in the AC parking areas to collect fuel sludge and special pallets to prevent fuel 
flow when changing fuel system configurations. In AC's periodic maintenance, the sewer 
lines are equipped with a basin for tanks, where together with the fuel, chemical liquids, 
the precipitate is emptied, washed from the surface of the site. Strict enforcement of rules 
on storage, transport and use of fuels and lubricants can prevent heavy carbon fractions, 
nitrogen dioxide, hydrogen sulphide from entering the atmosphere and groundwater. The 
collection of spent fuel in special containers and their subsequent treatment enables the 
rational use of the country's natural resources. With the development of the third-
generation Boeing 777X, Boeing worked with General Electric to provide a 2% 
improvement in fuel efficiency for the 777-300ERs in production. General Electric 
improved the fan module and high pressure compressor stage 1 bushing in the GE-90-





based on work to develop the 787, will reduce fuel combustion by 0.5%. Boeing’s wing 
changes were meant to deliver the rest. Boeing said every 1% improvement in 777-300ER 
fuel combustion means the ability to fly an additional 75 nmi (139 km; 86 mi) with the 
same fuel load or add ten passengers or 2,400 lb (1,100 kg). cargo for a "restricted" flight. 
 
5.2 The negative impact of air transport on the environment  
According annually issued articles from ICAO aviation industry overall impact on 
environmental pollution is relatively small. However, the dynamics of growth in air 
transportation in the world, accompanied by an increase in the number of AC, requires the 
most serious attitude to the issue related to environmental protection.  
The negative impact of aviation transport on the environment can be divided into two 
large groups :  
− substance chemical factors:  
− frequently emissions issues concerned with harmful substances of AC engines 
and their influence on the atmosphere, prevents the penetration of ultraviolet 
radiation;  
− availability on the territory of the aviation organization of a huge fuel oil 
storage facilities, wash grounds, which retain oil products, chemical solutions, 
mineral oils.  
−  factors of physical impact in the airport zone:  
−  jet engines noise;  
−  electromagnetic flashes of ground-based air traffic control systems.  
5.3 AC as a source of environmental pollution 
The projected growth of air traffic in the world limited harmful emissions from AC 
motors. ICAO has developed stricter standards for AC motor emissions in this regard.  
Gases for gas turbine engines contain the following main components that pollute 





propane, benzene, toluene, etc.), nitrogen oxides, aldehydes (formaldehyde, acrolin, 
acetic acid, etc.). (visible smoky steam behind the engine nozzle), benzo-pyrene. 
When the turbocharged engine and propeller engine are running for one minute, 2-4 
mg of carcinogens, mainly benzypyrene, are released into the atmosphere. 
Atmospheric emissions from AC motors in accordance with ICAO standards are not 
permitted and should be excluded when designing new AC motors and AC motors. It has 
been found that carbohydrates in airports due to the release of sewers account for almost 
20% of air pollution. 
The quantitative characteristic of emissions of harmful substances from an AC 
motor is the Mi / Ne emission index, which shows how many grams of a substance are 
released into the air when 1 kg of fuel is burned. 
This parameter describes "engine malfunction". 
In it:  
Mi - mass in grams of the ejected i-th harmful substance (ingredient) after some 
certain time of engine operation;  
Nе - takeoff thrust.  
The ICAO standards on the emission control parameter for the public day are as 
follows[22]:  
MCO / Nе = 0,56 g / kW; 
MCхНу / Nе = 0,2 g / kW; 
MNOx / Nе = 0,8 g / kW. 
5.4  Requirements of Ukrainian laws to ensure environmental safety 
Part VII "Environmental Security" of the Declaration on the Sovereignty of the State 
of Ukraine declares that Ukraine has the right to prohibit the construction or suspension of 
enterprises, establishments, plants and establishments that pose a threat to environmental 
safety. Ukraine cares about the environmental safety of its citizens.  
The Law on Economic Independence of Ukraine mentions these main objectives of 





and working conditions. The Law on Enterprises of Ukraine stipulates that all enterprises 
are obliged to take environmental measures in a timely manner. Companies are responsible 
for maintaining requirements and standards for nature conservation, the rational use of 
natural resources and restoration.  
Finally, the Ukrainian Environmental Protection Law defines the basic principles of 
environmental protection behalf of SAA: 
− priority of environmental safety requirements, mandatory compliance with 
environmental standards, norms and restrictions on the use of natural resources 
− ensuring an environmentally safe environment for human life and health; 
− greening materials production on the basis of a comprehensive solution to 
environmental issues. 
Among other measures, environmental expertise guarantees citizens' environmental 
rights. In Ukraine, governmental, civil and some other environmental assessments are 
planned, which must be carried out in legislation, investment, administration and economic 
activities that may affect the environment.  
The purpose of an environmental impact assessment is to: 
− identification of the environmental hazards of economic and other activities 
that may directly affect the state of the natural environment in the future; 
−  ensuring that projects comply with legal requirements; 
− аssessment of the completeness and validity of the anticipated conservation 
measures. 
The positive conclusions of the environmental impact assessment are the reasons for 
opening funding for the plant's development project. Without this, the creation of programs 
and projects is prohibited. Expert units of the Ministry of Environment and Nuclear Safety 
of Ukraine or specially established committees carry out the state's ecological expertise. 
Relevant administrations, other institutions and organizations will be invited to participate 
in this work. The conclusions of the state environmental review, after approval by the 





Public environmental assessment is carried out by independent expert groups at the 
initiative of public organizations and by local authorities at their own expense. This study is 
independent of state environmental expertise.  
Therefore, environmental expertise, on the other hand, is a measure to combat and 
prevent damage to the natural environment even before actual pollution. On the other hand, 
this study will enable companies to be classified according to the degree of environmental 
risk and to develop measures and ways to minimize the negative consequences of their 
activities. 
In current companies, greening of production is achieved by creating ecological 
passports. The ultimate goal of an environmental certificate is to reduce the harmful 
environmental impact of companies.  
5.5 Environmental hazard of the operation of the Boeing-777 and its systems  
 
At present, the environmental issues of AC use are more acute than ever. Not 
surprisingly, the consequences of human technological advances are so obvious that they 
are difficult to overlook. By conquering the skies, we have forgotten our impact on nature 
and the environment. Of course, air contact is not the most polluting activity in the human 
environment. 
Consequences of almost all human environmental activities. However, because 
habitats are directly related to the environment, it is not all that people who pollute the 
environment are poisoning themselves. Therefore, our task is not only to develop new 
alternatives, but also the environment.  
AC emits toxic gases from airport belts and airport engines. Gas turbine engine 
exhaust components include the following main components: carbon monoxide, 
hydrocarbons (methane CH4, acetylene C2H2, ethane C2H6, ethylene C2H4, propane 
C3H8, benzene C6H6, toluene C6H5CH3, etc.), nitric oxide, alkaline oxide, aldehyde, 
aldehyde CH2 = CH = CHB, acetaldehyde (CH3CH, etc.), sulfur oxides, soot (smoke lamps 





Running a turbojet or turbocharged engine for 1 minute releases 2-4 mg of 
carcinogens into the atmosphere, mainly benzopyrene. ICAO regulations do not allow the 
release of draining fuels into the AC atmosphere, so they should be excluded during the 
design of new AC motors and variables.  
The quantitative emission characteristic of AE is an emission index, which shows 
how many grams of a substance are released into the air when 1 kg of fuel is burned. 
The content of carbon monoxide and hydrocarbons in the AE emissions is determined 
from the complete combustion of the fuel. In these modes, maximum combustion of 
unburned fuel is observed because the combustion completeness of the fuel is minimal for 
the small temperature and air pressure in the combustion chamber. In addition, the low gas 
mode degrades the fuel injection, thereby degrading the completeness of combustion. In low 
gas mode, NO emissions will be minimal, engine takeoff mode will be maximized, and the 
combustion chamber temperature will be maximum. 
The noise situation of the airline and the surrounding area is determined by many 
sources of noise, the main of which are AC power plants and special vehicles for airport 
services for various purposes. In the territory of most airlines and in the territory of the 
airline, the noise created by the aviation facilities is predominant, and the reduction affects 
the interests of a large number of people. 
The main source of engine noise is the fan. 
The main components of propeller noise are rotational noise and spiral. 
Advances in science and technology have created an artificial electromagnetic field, 
the source of which is the transmitters of radar, radio navigation, and broadcasting stations. 
The amount of electromagnetic radiation emitted by these devices exceeds the natural area 
several times and affects human health.  
Medical and biological studies have shown that the degree of exposure to heavy 
electromagnetic fields depends on the frequency range, radiation intensity, nature, and 
duration of exposure. 
The nervous system is the most vulnerable to electromagnetic fields and its changes 





electroencephalogram transitions, and pathomorphological disorders of the brain and spinal 
cord. Electromagnetic fields radio frequencies directly affect the structure of the anterior 
lobe and interstitial brain, the nature of some biomechanical changes that cause conditioned 
reflex function, and the course of neural processes. Changes in the nervous system affect 
the functioning of the cardiovascular, endocrine and other systems. The effect of 
electromagnetic fields  causes cataracts in the eye - blurring the lens..  
The economic activities of airlines are related to AC services and contribute to the 
deterioration of environmental conditions. 
As a result of such operations in apron areas, parking lots, as well as hangars and large 
airports, up to 40 tons of hydrocarbons, solar, organic and mineral oil washing chemicals 
and phenols enter the soil per hour. The cause of such effects on the soil is the loss of fuel 
and lubricants during AC charging. However, not only does the soil spill flammable 
lubricants, it is also damaged by air. 
The number of losses should be reduced to minimize damage to the soil and 
atmosphere.  
5.6 Calculation of the control parameter for the emission of the GE-90 engine 
for compliance with ICAO emission requirements 
The concentration of CO and CXNY in the flue gas of an AC engine depends on the 
characteristics of its combustion chamber (the value of the combustion coefficient), the 
engine. The maximum amount of fuel combustion in the engine takes place in the design 
mode - takeoff (maximum thrust mode of the engine). 
In this mode, modern engines burn almost completely, which is not possible in 
practice. In all other modes, the value is low, ie the combustion completeness is low, the 
engine emits incomplete combustion products (CO and CXNY and others) into the 
atmosphere, and air pollution increases. 
The concentration of NOX in the flue gas of an AC engine depends on the temperature 





the maximum (up to 2500-3000 K) take-off mode and the longer the mixture resides in the 
combustion chamber. NOX), which occurs at low aircraft speeds. 
Maximum NOX emissions occur during engine takeoff mode and related modes, AC 
start-up, and flight altitude recruitment. It is clear that engine emissions in the airport area 
depend on its mode of operation and the duration of operation in this mode. Along the airport 
area, we will understand a space that is 100 m high and the aerodrome is limited in size. 
The engines of modern airliners operate in the airport zone in such modes and such a 
duration of operation (table 5.1). 
Table 5.1 Typical cycle of engine operation 
Name of the engine operating mode Relative thrust, Nе Duration of the regime, t, min 
The regime of small gas when taxiing 
before takeoff 
0,07 18 
Takeoff mode 1 0,7 
The climb mode (1000 m) 0,85 – 0,98 4.7 
Approach Mode 0,3 – 0,42 5 







,                                                 (5.1) 
where R – thrust of the engine in a given mode; 
Nе - thrust of the engine on takeoff (maximum thrust). 
The table shows the average statistical parameters (?̄? and t) for large airports in the 
world. 
As the table shows, the longest lasting and most dangerous to the environment is the 
small gas regime. In modern AC motors, the thrust value in this mode is 3-9 percent of the 
maximum value of Ne, and this mode is used before takeoff and after landing, as well as 
during engine warm-up. above. The duration of the taxi regime depends on the size of the 





During the certification process, determine the actual emission index appropriate to 
the engine operating mode and find the control parameters of the test engine 
Мі
𝑅0
  set by the 






[]],                                                (5.2) 
where Мі – mass in grams of the ejected i-th harmful substance (ingredient) after some 
certain time of engine operation; 
R0 – takeoff thrust of the engine in the kilonewtons. 
In these cases, the emissions of the AC motors will not be the same during the flight 
along the airport area and route, as the engines operate in fundamentally different modes. In 
this regard, pollution in the airport area is "more harmful" ( approximately 0.6 - 0.8 on the 
route). In addition, many are local pollution of the air surface layer of the airport area, which 
is more concentrated and more stable than the general pollution of the upper troposphere of 
the flight route. Moreover, for these reasons, pollution in the airport area is becoming more 
harmful. 
Therefore, the calculation of the emission of AC engines in the airport zone is more 
important, and we will give it more attention than the calculation during the flight along the 
route.  
"Degree of harmfulness" of each AC engine is characterized, as mentioned above, by 
its emission control parameters for various ingredients -
𝑀𝑖
𝑁𝑒
. The task of calculating engine 
emissions is to determine the mass of each ingredient thrown out of the engine after a certain 
time of its operation - М𝑖 (as Ne - engine thrust on the takeoff mode - the value known from 
the documentation, in particular from the form of the engine). 
We will calculate the quantities М𝑖 for the airport zone (from the above 
considerations), that is, М𝑖 = 𝑀𝑖А on those modes and for that period of time of its operation, 
while the AC is in this zone with operating engines. 
An AC in the airport zone is less than a flight runway that consists of the following 
stages:  





- Taxiing for executive launch;  
- Takeoff;  
- Climb - 1000 m;  
- Descend - 1000 m;  
- Mileage;  
- Taxiing till the engine stop.  
However, at these stages, AC motors operate in different modes. Therefore, for ease 
of calculation, the AC strip is divided into ground stages and take-off and landing stages.  
I.e Мian=Мig+Mit-l . 
Ground stages - this is the start of engines, their warm-up, taxiing the AC before take-
off and after landing.  
The main features of these operations (in order to calculate engine emissions) are the 
low gas  mode and time that AC motors operate in the same mode - these are the longest 
operations in the airport area. This situation simplifies the calculation.  
Мig=Kig Gfg, Kіg - the release factor of the i-th ingredient in terrestrial operations 
Gfg - mass of fuel spent by the engine of the AC for ground operations of the 
runway, kg. 
Gfg=Csp.lg  R lg  t lg, 
where Csp.lg – Specific fuel consumption during engine operation at the LG 
mode, kg/Нh; 
Rlg – thrust of the engine in the LG mode, Н; 
Tlg – engine run time low rpm mode, hours; 
Mi-to - total emission of i-th harmful substances during take-off operations, kg. 
Takeoff landing operations is takeoff, climbing – 1000 m, descending from height – 
1000 m and landing.  
In this case, to calculate the emission of AC engines that is in the air, the emission 
characteristic is the mass emission rate Wі (kg subs. / h), which shows how much of a given 
harmful substance is released in this mode of engine operation per unit time.  





Мito=Wi1 T1to+ Wi2 T2to+ Wi3 T3to , 
where   Т1,2,3 to - The operating time of the engine, respectively, during take-off, when 
climbing - 1000 m and with a decrease from the height - 1000 m, h; 
Wi1,2,3 - mass emission rate of i-th ingredient under suitable engine operation modes 
respectively at takeoff, climb - 1000 m and descend - 1000 kg / h.  
Data for calculation of emission control parameters of GE-90 engines of Boeing-777 
AC by ingredients СО, CxHy, NOx is given in tables 5.2 through 5.4. 
Table 5.2 – GE-90 engine running time in operating modes 
Name of the engine operating mode Thrust,Nе 
Duration of the regime t, 
minutes 
Running, warming up, taxiing 0,07 2 
End of Table 5.2. 
Takeoff 1 0,7 
Set of the height of 1000 m 0,85 2,2 
Approach for landing 0,3 4 
Taxiing after landing 0,07 6 
 
 
Table − 5.3 Standard emission data for engine emissions GE-90 
Harmful substances CO CxHy NOx 
Kin, (kg subs. / kg of fuel) 
for the engine GE-90 
0,035 0,015 0,005 
 
Table − 5.4 Table of the mass emission rate of the ingredient under the appropriate engine 
operating conditions 
Mass emission rate,  
kg sub. / h 
Engine operating mode 
Takeoff Cruising Nominal 
WCO 2,65 2,4 2,4 





Mass emission rate,  
kg sub. / h 
Engine operating mode 
Takeoff Cruising Nominal 
WNO 3,5 2 2,5 
 
Engine specifications: 
Nе = 2500  h.p. = 1850 kW; Ncr= 1300 kW;  Csp.lg = 0,025 кg / kWh 
From table 5.2: 
Тog = 2 min = 0,367 (h) ; 
T1fl = 0,7 min = 0,0117 (h); 
T2fl = 2,2 min = 0,0367 (h); 
T3fl = 4 min = 0,067 (h); 
Then  Gfg = 0,069 · 378 · 0,033 = 0,86(kg). 
Determine the mass of each ingredient that thrown out by the engine when working 
on the ground: 
MCO = 0,035 · 0,86 = 0,03 (kg); 
MCH = 0,015 · 0,86 = 0,013 (kg); 
МNO = 0,005 · 0,86 = 0,0043 (kg); 
MCOto = 2,65 · 0,01 + 2,4 · 0,0367 + 2,4 · 0,1= 0,35 (kg); 
MCHto = 0,5·0,01 + 0,55·0,0367 + 0,5·0,1= 0,075 (kg); 
МNOto = 3,5·0,01 + 2·0,0367 + 2,5·0,1= 0,358 (kg). 
Calculating mass emission in the terminal area: 
MCO = 0,03 + 0,35 = 0,38 (kg); 
MCH = 0,013 + 0,075 = 0,088 (kg); 
МNO= 0,0043 + 0,358 = 0,362 (kg). 
ICAO standards on the emission control parameter for AC engines are currently: 
MCO/Nе = 0,56 g / kW;  MCH/Nе = 0,2 g / kW;  MNO/Nе  = 0,8 g / kW; 
MCO/Nе = 380/1850 = 0,23 < 0,56 g / kW; 
MCH/Nе = 88/1850 = 0,08 < 0,2 g / kW; 





According to the values obtained, it follows that the engine emission does not exceed 





CONCLUSION TO PART 5 
Therefore, AC motors meet ICAO standards for all parameters. Due to the growing 
impact of the artificial environment, its protection is the most pressing and multifaceted 
issue. In recent years, environmental issues have become more and more important. It is 
gradually becoming a global issue, and it is becoming more and more acute. 
The reasons for this situation are various anthropogenic factors. It's like a population 
explosion and rapid urbanization. The enormous impact on the environment is caused by 
human factors: waste disposal, pollution of reservoirs and forests, increasing the load on 
farmland - this is human work. Reducing fuel consumption and CO2 emissions has become 
a priority in the development of aviation technology, thanks to a number of innovations and 
developments in recent years. At present, data on the efficiency and cost of basic technology 
engines, transmission and alternating current show that industrial development in the next 
10-15 years will lead to a 20-30% reduction in fuel consumption and CO2 emissions.. 
The controlled emission parameters of carbon monoxide CO, a mixture of 
hydrocarbon compounds CxNx, and nitrogen oxide NOx are within the ICAO standard 
limits, and their values are very small compared to the limit values. Based on the above, it 

















1. The analysis of the operational characteristics of the Boeing 777 fuel system 
shows that the fuel system must be reliable, meet the highest requirements for 
production and maintenance. Analyzed statistical data on Boeing-777 fuel system 
failures and malfunctions. The main cause of the error is a malfunction of the pump. 
2. The installation of a labyrinth seal instead of a lip seal offers a creative way 
to increase operational capability. The use of labyrinth seals reduces fuel pump 
service failure and economic costs. 
3. The labyrinth seal of the rotating shaft provides non-contact sealing by 
controlling the fluid flow by centrifugal motion and by creating a controlled fluid 
vortex. At higher speeds, the centrifugal motion pushes the fluid away from any part 
of the body. Similarly, if the labyrinth chamber is designed correctly, the liquid from 
the main chamber is wrapped around the labyrinth chamber and moved in a spiral 
motion. This prevents it from escaping and removes other liquids. 
4. This design of the sealing part allows to reduce the flow when the geometric 
size and shape of the labyrinth head sealing part changes during the transition to 
higher pressure, which greatly affects the rotor consumption and axial displacement; 
Slope compaction against the spine creates low pressure in the last gap, and 
compacted slope compression creates low pressure in the last chamber; 
The circular ribs on the vertical axis and the expansion of the chamber increase 
the gas flow path inside the chamber, creating a lower velocity in the chamber, 
reducing the pressure in the last gap, and creating a minimum groove from the 
labyrinth seal. 
5. Damage to the maze seal of the centrifugal fan has a significant impact not 
only on power consumption but also on the production level. Improving abrasion-
resistant seals is important not only to improve current efficiency and capacity, but 
also to keep them at a more critical level. Head and efficiency are reduced during 
damaged maze seals [15]. The performance curve is shifted down and to the left, 





6. Based on the analysis of hazardous and noxious industrial factors occurring 
during the maintenance of the AC fuel system, measures have been developed to 
improve the safety during maintenance and operation, in addition to short-term 
maintenance of the Boeing-777 AC. . 
7. AC-mounted engines comply with ICAO standards for all parameters. Due 
to the growing impact of the artificial environment, its protection is the most pressing 
and multifaceted issue. In recent years, environmental issues have become more and 
more important. It is gradually becoming a global issue, and it is becoming more and 
more acute. 
8. Most people agree that lip seals need to be removed regularly for unknown 
reasons, but engineers should always look at the picture. It is known that all 
applications for the use of lip seals are already over, but new options have emerged 
for users who know the reliability and energy. Unfortunately, the lip seal does not 
meet the expectations of most intermediate pump users. It makes no difference that 

















1. TE Munns and RM Kent, ‘Structural Health monitoring degradation 
mechanism and system requirements’, 19th proc. of Digital Avionics Systems Conf. DASC, 
Philadelphia, USA, 2000.  
2. PM Pawar and R Ganguli, ‘Helicopter rotor health monitoring – a review’, 
Proceedings of IMechE Vol. 221 Part G: J. Aerospace Engineering, 2007.  
3. ‘A Review of Structural Health Monitoring Literature: 1996-2001’, Los 
Alamos National Laboratory Report, LA-13976-MS, 2003.  
4. C Boller and M Buderath, ‘Fatigue in aero structures—where structural health 
monitoring can contribute to complex subject’, Phil. Trans. R. Soc. A, Vol 365, pp 561–
587, 2007.  
5. E Taylor, ‘Structural monitoring system, keeping aircraft out of the hangar’, 
Australian aviation, July 2008.  
6. H Stehmeier and H Speckmann, ‘Comparative Vacuum Monitoring (CVM) 
Monitoring of fatigue cracking in aircraft structures’, 2nd European Workshop on Structural 
Health Monitoring, Munich/Germany, July 7 - 9, 2004.  
7. RD Finlayson et al, ‘Health Monitoring of Aerospace Structures with Acoustic 
Emission and Acousto-Ultrasonics’, 15th conf. of WCNDT, Rome, 2000.  
8. H Pfeiffer and M Wevers, ‘Aircraft Integrated Structural Health Assessment – 
Structural Health Monitoring and its implementation within the European project AISHA’, 
EU Project Meeting on Aircraft Integrated Structural Health Assessment (AISHA), Leuven, 
Belgium, June 2007.  
9. VK Varadan and VV Varadan, ‘Wireless Remotely Readable and 
Programmable Microsensors and MEMS for Health Monitoring of Aircraft Structures’, in 
”Structural Health Monitoring”, pp. 96–105, CRC Press, 1999. 















Turboprop engines and especially engines of An-140 are known to be one of the most 










Figure 1.3 – Failures distribution 







Table 1.6 – Statistics of fuel system subsystems failures o for the operation period 
 
  
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Overall 
Overall, 
% 
Fuel drainage 0 0 1 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 1 2 1 0 11 22,9 
Refueling 0 0 1 0 1 3 1 0 1 2 1 0 1 0 11 22,9 
Feeding 0 0 2 1 2 1 2 0 1 1 2 2 1 2 17 35,4 
Fuel consumption 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 1 0 3 1 0 0 0 9 18,8 
Overall 0 0 4 3 6 7 5 1 2 6 5 4 3 2 48 100,0 
Year 
Subsystem 
 
 
 
 
 
